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This dissertation explores two types of legislation, campaign finance reform and climate 
change legislation, in order to examine the determinants of congressional voting on these 
acts.  Chapter One outlines a theoretical model based on a model by Denzau and Munger 
(1986) that predicts that Representatives will vote for campaign finance reform if it 
improves their campaign contribution position relative to that of their opponents, rather 
than improves their position absolutely.  Empirical estimates show that this is in fact the 
case and that voting on the 2002 Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act was based on this 
rather than on party as others had claimed.  Chapter Two examines the determinants of 
the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007.  This analysis finds that Senatorial 
voting for this act was based not on the potential health threats to the Senators states but 
rather on the cost of the act and the political affiliation of the Senator and his or her 
constituents.  Chapter Three looks at seven economic analyses of Lieberman-Warner Act 
in more depth.  This analysis finds that the economic impacts predicted by these analyses 
are sensitive to the assumptions made by the researchers.  It also finds that many of these 
studies find that the cost of the Lieberman-Warner Act will be approximately $1,000 per 
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The passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 (also known as the 
McCain-Feingold Act) contains a puzzle.  The law was designed to expand the ability of 
candidates to raise money from individual donors and also crack down on the use of 
unlimited soft money by the parties.  The puzzle is that the bill was voted for largely by 
Democrats even though the Democrats raised more soft money than their Republican 
opponents.  The explanations offered as to why Democrats would vote for such a bill 
include ideology and impatience.  These explanations are not wholly satisfactory.  This 
paper seeks to explain the apparent contradiction by revising the model of how 
incumbents raise money for campaigns created by Denzau and Munger (1986) to include 
contribution limits and the incumbent’s ability to set them.  The implications of this 
model are that incumbents compare their own fund-raising abilities to that of their 
opponents to determine if the law would help their opponent more than it would help 
them.  Using data on campaign contributions from the Federal Election Commission, this 





The passage of the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA) of 2002 (also known as the 
McCain-Feingold Act) contains a puzzle.  The object of the act was to control so-called 
“soft money” campaign funding-money donated to the national party committees to avoid 
the federal limitations placed on donations given directly to candidates.  The law raised 
the limits on hard-money contributions while, at the same time, subjecting the donations 
to the national parties - which had previously been unregulated - to the same laws as hard 
money donations. The law would appear to make fundraising more difficult for 
candidates who relied on soft money for their campaigns; yet, the party that relied most 
heavily on soft money was the party that voted for its passage. .  Republicans in 2000 
raised $148 million in soft money while Democrats raised $190 million (La Raja).  In 
terms of hard money, House Republican candidates raised around $273 million dollars 
while House Democratic candidates raised $264 million dollars (FEC data).  While called 
“bipartisan,” the final roll call vote on the BCRA was largely split down party lines.  Out 
of 210 Democrats in the House, 198 voted in favor of the bill; out of 217 Republicans in 
the House, only 41 voted in favor of the bill.  
 
The McCain-Feingold Act of 2002 was passed after several scandals involving campaign 
finance came to the forefront of popular attention. Vice President Gore was involved in a 
high-profile scandal over fundraising activities conducted from the White House 
(Toronto Star 2000).  Claims of corruption also arose when it was discovered that the 
bankrupt energy trader Enron and many accounting firms had spent over $1.7 million 
dollars on the campaigns of legislators in the 2000 cycle.  While it was never proven that 
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the donations directly induced legislators to defeat bills that would have tightened 
auditing standards, it did create an appearance of corruption (Washington Post 2002). 
 
These scandals were emblematic of the larger trends in campaign finance that had been 
occurring throughout the 1990’s.  Soft money escalated from $86 million in 1994 to $495 
million in 2000 (Malbin 2003).  Spending on House campaigns increased by 64% in real 
terms over the period from 1990 to 2004.  In 2000 national party committees raised $496 
million in soft money, $280 million of which was funneled to the state party committees 
(La Raja 2001). All told, the local, state and national parties spent $480 million.  Much of 
this money, $160 million, was spent on overhead and administration costs,  $65 million 
was spent on efforts to raise additional money and $229 million was spent on media, 
mobilization and grassroots campaign activities (La Raja 2000).     
 
The Federal Election Campaign Act of 1974 (FECA) required that all donations made 
directly to a candidate be subject to rules on declaring the source of the contribution and 
limiting the amount from certain sources.  Individual donors were allowed to give $1,000 
directly to a campaign; the party committees and other political action committees were 
allowed to give $5,0001 (CFI 2002). If an individual wanted to donate more, he or she 
had to circumvent FECA-established rules by donating to the parties.  Parties were 
allowed to spend this unregulated “soft money” on party-building activities, voter 
registration drives and issue advertising.  Soft money could be spent on issue advertising 
because issue advertising did not expressly advocate the election or defeat of a particular 
                                                
1  FECA did not index the contributions to inflation.  When enacted in 1974 an 
individual was able to donate $4,170 in today’s dollars. 
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candidate.  Candidates could raise soft money from donors and have party committees 
earmark those funds to be used in his or her home state.  
 
Given that Republicans at the time appeared to have the advantage in raising hard money, 
and the Democrats have a soft money advantage, the perplexing issue is then, why were 
so many Democrats in favor of the bill when the changes proposed by the BCRA would 
curtail soft-money contributions? 
 
In the press, many commentators opined that the BCRA would hurt Democrats (Devroy 
1989, Lambro 2001). Senator John B. Breaux of Louisiana even changed position on the 
bill since upon careful examination of the bill he realized it would “hurt the Democratic 
Party's ability to raise money more than it would hurt the Republicans.” (Kuhnhenn 
2001)  Some commentators suggested that the law was done more for show than for 
actual reform (Samples 2001).   
 
In academic journals, two explanations are offered.  Dennis (1996) looks does empirical 
work estimating the effect of party, ideology and constituent ideology on Senators’ vote 
for a precursor of the BCRA that never broke the filibuster to make it to a final vote.  
Dennis finds that liberal ideology, as measured by the score given to Senators by 
Americans for Democratic, explains why Senators voted as they did.  Another 
explanation for the vote comes from Stephenson (2003).  Stephenson notes that 
Democrats knew that they would be erasing their soft-money advantage with the passage 
of the bill, but that they also knew the bill would be well perceived in the public eye.  For 
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Stephenson, Democrats rationally traded off soft-money in the future for votes in the up-
coming election.  Stephenson further estimated that the Democrats must have had a 
discount rate of higher than 18%.   
 
Rather than rely solely on ideology (Dennis 1996) or extreme time preferences 
(Stephenson 2003) for an explanation, this paper seeks to explain why certain candidates 
voted for or against the BCRA based on the characteristics of their fundraising.  This 
paper presents revised version of the model by Denzau and Munger (1986) of campaign 
finance.  The revisions include the addition of contribution limits to the choice of how 
effort is allocated between possible donors and also set the campaign fundraising process 
into the incumbent legislator’s choice of the limit.  The implication of these changes is 
that incumbents would vote for a change in the limit if it improved their margin of 
victory.  An incumbent will compare her ability to raise certain kinds of funds relative to 
her opponent’s ability and then decide if the new contribution limits improve her 
situation.   
 
This paper uses data from the Federal Election Commission on various sources of 
campaign funds to estimate the how changes in the relative fundraising ability of 
incumbents influence their likelihood of support.  Specifically, I use OLS and logit 
regressions to find the effect of changes in fundraising ability between incumbents and 
their opponents.  The paper also replicates the regressions estimated by Dennis for 
comparison.  The results provide evidence that those incumbents who benefited from 
increasing their individual donations relative to their opponents were more likely to vote 
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for the bill.  Thus, part of the explanation of why Democrats would willingly vote for the 
McCain-Feingold Act is that it disadvantaged their subsequent challengers relative to 
themselves.  
 
Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act 2002 
Prior to the passage of the BCRA, the laws governing campaign fundraising were set 
down by the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA).   Many of the original 
provisions of FECA were amended in 1974.  One of those amendments created the 
Federal Election Commission in order to enforce the rules.  The main rules governing 
campaign finance until 2002 were: 
• Individual contribution limit of $1,000 per year for each election which in total 
could not exceed $25,000 
• Individual hard-money contribution limit of $20,000 per year to national party 
committees; $5,000 per year to state party federal committees 
• No limit on individual contributions of soft-money to national, state and local 
committees 
• Political Action Committee contribution limit of $5,000 to candidate campaigns 
or other PACs 
• Limits not indexed to CPI to adjust for inflation 
• Disclosure rules 
 
Individual donors as well as state and national party committees were limited in the 
amount of hard money that they could donate to any particular candidate.  Hard money 
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was the only allowable source for express advocacy advertising that used specific 
language like “Elect Smith” or “Defeat Jones.”  However, parties were free to spend 
money on generic party building activities like voter registration, get out the vote and 
issue ads.  Issue advertising was defined as any advertising that did not mention a 
candidate and only discussed a particular issue like health care. Issue advertising also 
included advertising which discussed a specific candidate but avoided the language 
defined by Congress to be expressly advocating a candidate (CFI 2002). 
 
The Act left national and state parties free to spend unlimited amounts of soft money on 
issue ads, soft money became a larger part of funding for federal elections.  Labor unions 
and corporations were free to donate unlimited amounts of soft money for issue ads (CFI 
2002).  The two parties total soft-money expenditures steadily increased from $86 million 
in 1992 to nearly $500 million in 2000 (Magleby 2007).  Concerns were growing: 
unregulated money was increasing the cost of campaigning again and also allowing for 
the appearance of corruption.  In essence, the national and state political parties were able 
to raise unlimited soft money, of which they could donate limited amounts as hard money 
to candidates’ campaigns and spend as much as they chose on issue ads.   
 
The BCRA aimed to limit soft money expenditures and replace them with regulated, 
disclosed, hard money instead.  BRCA changed the campaign finance laws so that: 
• All hard money rules now apply to party committees 
• All expenditure on issue ads must be disclosed 
• Hard money limits raised 
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o Individual donations to a candidate $2,000 
o Individual donation to a party $25,000 
• Millionaire’s Provision 
o If a candidate self-finances a campaign by more than $150,000 
plus $0.04 per eligible voter, then the challenger’s hard money 
limits increase 
• Unions and corporations are now prohibited from funding issue ads except 
when through PAC’s 
• All amounts are now indexed to inflation by the CPI 
 
A Model of Campaign Finance 
 
The basis of this analysis is the model used by Denzau and Munger (1986).  As in their 
model, candidates are assumed to exert effort in order to raise money to finance their 
campaigns.  This money can come from variety of sources: the candidate, individual 
donors and political action committees.  In my model, it is assumed that all money comes 
from individual donors.  Prior to the next campaign, incumbents choose whether to have 
a contribution limit (X) and how high to set it.  This limit constrains their own donors and 
their opponent’s donors.   
 
The incumbents wish to maximize the difference (D) between their total campaign 
resources (R) and their opponents’2 subject to the condition that any constraints must 
                                                
2  In reality, it is likely that they will be maximizing their vote share, but the result 
is largely the same. 
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apply equally to all candidates.  The subscript A denotes the total resources of the 







       (1) 
     
The total resources available to the incumbent or the challenger are the sum of all 
individual contributions.  Each donor gives to a candidate in response to how much effort 
(E) that the candidate has given - or is expected give when elected - to the policies that 
the donor likes. The total effort that a candidate has is limited, and, thus, the candidate 
attempts to maximize her total resources subject to the amount of effort with which she is 
endowed.  For notational simplicity, subscripts denoting incumbent and challenger are 
dropped until later since the maximization process will be the same for both challenger 
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Effort may be thought of as time spent voting or crafting legislation or constituency 
services.  Increasing the effort devoted to one source of contributions will yield more 
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Once a contribution limit is in place, a candidate must maximize total resources with 
respect to the contribution limit, as well as the effort constraint.  Contribution limits cap 
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By the time of the next election, the contribution limit has been set and both incumbents 
and challengers maximize total campaign resources by allocating effort among various 
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Condition (9) specifies that all choices of effort must be non-negative.  Equation (14) 
implies that if the effort constraint does not hold-a candidate does not expend all effort-
then the shadow cost of effort is zero.  Equation (15) implies that if the contribution limit 
does not hold then the shadow cost of additional contributions from that donor is zero.   
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Picking a contribution limit that is higher than the amount donated by the highest donor 
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Equation (16) specifies that the contributions gained by allocating additional effort to an 
individual source must be equal to the shadow cost.  Putting each of the individual donors 
together in equation (17) implies that the contribution gained from an additional unit of 
effort will be the same from all donors.   
 
Since the resource equations are invertible, there is a unique amount of effort that 















i X( ) = E i              (19) 
 
When the contribution limits do hold for all of the donors, then the effort limit does not.  
The shadow cost of additional effort for that donor is zero. This causes equation (15) to 
reduce to equation (18) where each donor gives X dollars. Candidates devote just enough 
effort to each source to get the donation of X.  The total campaign resources in this case 
would be the number of donors multiplied by the contribution limit.   
 
The interesting case is when some contribution limits hold while others do not.  In this 
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Equation (20) implies that the contribution in response to additional effort will be higher 
than the shadow cost of effort for constrained donors.  Candidates would like to devote 
additional effort to raising money from these donors; however, the law prevents them 
from gaining campaign resources in this way so the candidate devotes more effort to 
unconstrained donors.  Equation (21) shows that the shadow cost of effort must be lower 
when the contribution limits are binding than when they are not.   
 
Once the maximization problem has been solved, the incumbents know how much effort 
to devote to each donor based on the marginal productivity of effort and the amount of 
the campaign limit.  Incumbents also know how their challengers will react to different 
contribution limits and, thus, how much they will raise in total.   
 
For simplicity, assume that the incumbent and the challenger have two potential donors 
(n=2).  When X is low enough, both donors are constrained.  Since total resources equals 
the sum of both individual donors both giving X, total campaign resources as a function 
of the contribution limit are simply: 
! 
R = X + X = 2X                        (22) 
! 
E = R"11 X( ) + R"12 X( )           (23) 
 
As the contribution limit increases, the effort constraint gets closer to binding.  At some 
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point, X will be such that the effort required to raise 2X is equal to the total amount of 
effort available.  At higher levels of contribution limits, one of the contribution limits will 
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1 X( ) = E2            (25) 
The candidate will devote enough effort to Contributor 1 and allocate the remaining 
effort to Contributor 2.  As the contribution limit increases, the candidate will allocate 
more effort to the constrained Contributor 1 and less effort to Contributor 2 who will 
continue to donate less than the limit.  Given that there are only two donors in this 
example, all effort not devoted to the constrained donor goes to the unconstrained donor.   
! 




1 X( )[ ]           (25) 
 
Thus, total campaign resources as a function of the contribution limit can be described by 
Equation 23.   
 
There is a point at which the contribution limit is high enough that neither donor is 
constrained, and only the effort limit is binding.  Increasing the contribution limit above 
this point will have no affect on total campaign resources raised.   
 
The choice of X is thus determined in reverse.  The incumbent and the challenger 
determine the optimal amount of effort for each donor as a function of the contribution 
limit.  Then, the incumbent attempts to maximize the difference between her and her 
opponent’s total campaign resources.  The subscript A and B are reintroduced here 
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Recall equation (19) which shows that the amount of effort needed to achieve a 
contribution of X is determined by the inverse of the individual donor’s contribution 
response to effort.  As X increases more effort goes into the constrained donor.  
Additional effort in the constrained donor reduces the amount of effort remaining for the 
unconstrained donor.  The first part of equation (29) is positive since increasing X 
increases the effort it takes to raise X dollars; moreover, increasing X also increases the 
effort used to raise money from the constrained donor leaving less effort for the 
remaining unconstrained donor.  Thus, equation (29) implies that raising the contribution 
limit will increase the difference between the incumbent’s total campaign resources and 
the challenger’s total campaign resources - if the first half of equation (29) is larger than 
the second or if the additional campaign resources gained by the incumbent are greater 
than the recourses gained by her opponent.   
 
That result is simple enough, but it implies that an incumbent will look at two things.  
How different are her best and next-best donors? And how different are her opponent’s 
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best and next-best donors?   
 
Increasing the limit allows an incumbent to raise more money in total, but to receive 
more money from the most generous donor, she must relinquish money from the other 
donors.  The incumbent knows this happens to her opponent as well.  As the contribution 
limit increases, both candidates allocate effort towards donors that give more in response 
to additional effort.  If the incumbent has two similarly generous donors, then changing 
the allocation of effort will do little.  The gain will be barely larger than the cost.  If the 
incumbent has both a generous donor and a stingy donor, then raising the contribution 
limit will allow the incumbent to allocate effort away from the stingy donor to the 
generous donor, losing little and gaining much.   
 
The incumbent will look at how her donors compare and compare that to how her 
challenger’s donors do as well.  The level of contributions is not as important as how 
productive the two candidates are at reallocating effort between their donors relative to 
each other.   
 





Figure 2 shows the difference between the two candidates’ resources.  The graph shows 
that a contribution limit may be preferred to an unconstrained limit.  If a candidate favors 
increasing the campaign limit, it is likely their reallocation of effort will be more 




Other Theoretical Explanations: 
There are other explanations that have been offered to explain why the Democrats would 
vote of the BCRA. One explanation claims that differences in ideology explain why 
Democrats voted for the bill (Dennis 1998).  As Dougan and Munger (1989) show, 
ideology can be a commitment device.  Since his estimation was done in 1998, he uses 
cloture vote in the Senate that would bring the version of the BCRA being considered at 
the time to a final vote. Dennis uses several variables to capture ideology, which include 
a party dummy variable, survey data on political beliefs of each state and ADA scores.  
He also includes dummy variables for if the Senator was up for reelection and the margin 
of victory by which the Senator won his or her seat.  In his regression results, the 
Senator’s ADA score was the only significant variable that affected the vote for the act 
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prompting Dennis to conclude that the vote was cast primarily for ideological reasons. 
 
Another possibility is that the incumbents valued the votes they would receive from their 
constituencies in the upcoming election more than the soft money they would receive in 
the future (Stephenson 2003).  Stephenson models the approach in what he calls an 
“issue-based prisoner’s dilemma,” resulting in a trade-off between votes today and future 
soft-money.  Since the average growth rate in soft money for those incumbents that voted 
for the BCRA was 18.7%, he reasons that their discount rate must be higher than that.  
Stephenson does not posit any reasons why in particular Democrats were more impatient 
that Republicans.   
 
The revised Denzau/Munger model outlined above is an attempt to create a model in 
which maximizing incumbents with knowledge of the competitors abilities might impose 
campaign limits in such a way as to better themselves.  Thus, the theory should explain 
the reason behind the apparently contradictory Democrats. 
 
Data: Sources 
The data in this paper come from the FEC, which requires all candidates report 
contribution information by law.  The detailed files of the FEC contain information on 
what person or political action committee donated and when.  The site also aggregates the 
contribution information for each candidate.  The data examined in this paper begins in 
2000 – the election cycle prior to the law change – and continues into 2004 the first 
election under the new rules of the BCRA. 
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From the records of the Clerk of the House, each Representative who voted on the BCRA 
was followed from the election before the law changes to after the law change.  Using 
FEC reports on the elections, each incumbent who voted on the BCRA was paired with 
their main party – Republican or Democrat – opponent.   
 
In order to replicate the work of Dennis on the 2002 vote on the BCRA, data on political 
variables comes from a variety of places.  ADA scores come from the Americans for 
Democratic Action website.  Data on the political ideology of each state comes from a 
survey  conducted from 1976 to 1988 as reported by Erikson et. al (1993).   
 
Data: Summary 
An examination of the data shows that, on average, total receipts and total campaign 
spending went up the most for those incumbents who were against the BCRA.  Non-
supporters also, on average, get more money from individual donors.  The data on money 
from labor and corporate PACs seems spilt along party lines.  This might lead you to 
conclude that the supporters voted in favor of a bill that would hurt them while non-
supporters voted against a bill that helped them the most.  However, as the model above 
predicts, it is not the levels of these variables that matter, rather how these levels change 
relative to their opponents.   
 
Empirical Model 
The data gathered for this study tests the implications of the revised Denzau/Munger 
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model outline above and contrasts those results with Dennis’ specification.   
 
The theory presented above implies that when incumbents set the contribution limit, it is 
not the level of their contributions that they are concerned with; rather it is the change in 
their contributions relative to their opponents’.  Just because an incumbent raises more 
money from individual donors does not necessarily imply that the incumbent would want 
the contribution limit raised.  Raising the contribution limit could advantage his opponent 
more than advantaging himself.   
 
To test the implications of the model, this paper will first look a simple specification.  
Once enacted, the changes in campaign finance laws made by the BCRA would raise the 
contribution limit for individual donors.  According to the theory, an incumbent will vote 
for the law change if increasing the contribution limit increases the amount of money the 
incumbent raises by more than the amount of money her opponent is able to raise.   
 
The theory described earlier implies that these are not the variables that the regression 
should include.  The variables that should be included include change over time and 
change relative to opponents.  To compare the incumbent to the challenger, I create a 












Essentially, the variable measures what percent of the total amount of some type of 
funding is raised by the incumbent.  For example, if the incumbent raised $70,000 in 
individual contributions and the challenger raised $30,000, then the percent advantage of 
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the incumbent would be 70%.  To see how this varies over time, the percent advantage is 























Incumbents who were able to increase their lead in comparison to their opponents 
should be more likely to vote for the BCRA.   
 
The final series of regression are: 
Vote for the BCRA = f (Democratic Dummy, ADA score, General 
Election Vote Share, General Election Vote Share and Democrat 
Interaction, Liberalness of Constituency, Change in Percent Advantage in 
Total Campaign Spending, Change in Percent Advantage in Individual 
Contributions, Change in Percent Advantage in Corporate Contributions, 
Change in Percent Advantage in Labor Contributions)   
 
Table 1 reports the results from the initial series of regressions.  Because of the 
process by which percent advantage is created, some observations are unusable.  
The remaining observations are of Representatives that ran both in 2000 and 2004 
and who had opponents who raised enough money to be require filing with the 
FEC in both periods.   
 
In this specification, relative changes in labor and corporate contributions do not 
play a large roll in whether a candidate votes for the BCRA.  This makes sense as 
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the law did not change the rules regarding how a union or corporation could 
donate to candidates.  The negative sign on the change in total spending is likely 
due to the fact that if the law improved the position of an incumbent’s challenger 
then the incumbent would have to spend more in response in order to keep her 
percent advantage constant before and after the law change. If challenger 
spending is more effective at getting votes than incumbent spending, incumbents 
would have to increase spending relative to opponents even more causing their 
percent advantage in spending to increase in order to keep their vote margin the 
same.  There are several studies that estimate the marginal effect on vote share of 
challenger spending is higher than incumbent spending(Abramowitz 1998, 
Jacobson 1990, Levitt 1994), but there is not consensus in the literature (Green 
and Krasno 1988). 
 
The change in percent advantage for individual contributions does change in the 
expected direction and is significant at the 1% level.  For ease of calculation using 
the OLS results, a 1% increase in percent advantage over his or her opponents 
leads the incumbent to be .57% increase in the likelihood of voting for the bill.  
The average Representative saw a 1.7 percentage point increase in percent 
advantage over her opponents.  A Representative that was one standard deviation 
above the mean saw a 0.27 percentage point increase in percent advantage in 
individual contributions which translates into 15% increase in the likelihood of 
voting for the bill.   
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For comparison, this paper will also replicate the empirical work done by Dennis (1996).  
In his study, Dennis, uses the cloture vote on an early version of the BCRA in the Senate.  
This study uses the actual vote in the House, so it benefits from more observations.  
Because this study focuses on the House, the dummy variable for a reelection campaign 
in the coming cycle is unusable as Representatives are reelected every two years.   Also, 
to be more easily compared to later estimates, I will use a Representative’s general 
election vote share rather than the margin of victory.  
 
Vote for the BCRA = f (Democratic Dummy, ADA score, General 
Election Vote Share, Liberalness of Constituency)   
 
The results of this estimate are presented above in Table 1.  The results Dennis 
found are reported in column 1.  Column 2 reports the re-estimation of Dennis’ 
results using the data from 2002.  Only one of Dennis’ original variables was 
significant and again, in the re-estimation that is true.  For Dennis, the Senator’s 
ADA rating was positive and significant at the 1% level. In this study, it is 
Democratic dummy variable that captures the ideological component.  This 
comparison demonstrates that the results found in Table 1 are not due to the 
different samples.   
  
Further, the revised Denzau/Munger theory can explain some results that Dennis 
was unsure of.  Dennis mentions in his paper that he is surprised that the closeness 
of the election as measured by margin of victory was not significant.  The theory 
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presented in this paper shows that closeness or safety in the general election has 
no effect on whether or not a Representative (or Senator) would vote for the 
BCRA.  There is an argument that perhaps Representatives might vote for a bill 
that while bad for themselves would be good for other members of their party.   A 
Representative’s interest in doing such a thing would be responsive to how large 
their margin of victory is.  For this reason, the following estimates will contain the 
interaction between the general election vote share and party.   
 
The final series of regressions will estimate how the levels different types of campaign 
contributions affect the likelihood of voting in favor for the BCRA.  These regressions 
will also include the political variables from Dennis’s work.  This test will form a more 
traditional analysis in that it includes the levels of campaign spending as well as the 
political variables used by Dennis.  In this way, the following specification will estimate 
the degree to which the levels, the changes in relative advantage, and political variables 
affect the likelihood of voting in favor of reform. 
 
Vote for the BCRA = f (Democratic Dummy, ADA score, General 
Election Vote Share, General Election Vote Share and Democrat 
Interaction, Liberalness of Constituency, Total Campaign Spending, 
Individual Contributions, Corporate Contributions, Labor Contributions)   
 
The results imply that the money raised from individual contributions was not 
significantly associated with increased likelihood voting for the BCRA.  The results from 
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Column 6 and 7 imply that the battle over the BCRA was between candidates who 
receive money from labor PACs and corporate PACs.  This may simply be due to party 
as labor mostly donates to Democratic candidates. 
 
The results from Column 6 and 7 show that being a Democrat (and being a Democrat 
from a safer district) is associated with a higher likelihood of voting for the BCRA.  
Thus, it would appear Democrats are voting based on ideology with safer Democrats 
more likely to vote in favor. Those results disappear once the change in percent 
advantage variables are added; implying that Democratic Representatives were not more 
likely to vote in favor of the BCRA when their elections were safer.   
 
Conclusion 
The story behind the passage of the BCRA illustrates how ideology and self-
interest on the part of incumbents guided the vote for campaign finance reform.  
While the soft money advantage that Democrats had prior to the passage seems to 
imply that they should be uninterested in voting for the BCRA, this is because 
there are unobserved characteristics common to groups of incumbents.  
Democrats, in spite of having lower levels of hard money and higher levels of soft 
money that Republicans, can benefit from the change in law because the absolute 
levels are not what the incumbents were using to make their decision. Incumbents 
looked for a change in contributions relative to their opponents as a factor in 
determining whether an incumbent was going to vote for the BCRA.     
 
 27 
Empirical estimation supports this, finding that if a the law increased an incumbent’s 
share of total individual campaign contributions relative to her opponent by 1 percentage 
point then the incumbent would be more likely to vote for the BCRA by 0.57%.  Ideology 
was still a large part of why Democrats voted for the BCRA, the changes in hard-money 
contributions were large enough to potentially sway incumbents who were at the margin.  
The empirical estimation of this model has other implications; the negative sign on the 
change in relative advantage in total spending demonstrates that candidates do not like 
having to spend more money on campaigns even when more money increases the amount 
they spend relative to their opponents.  This may support the theory that additional 











House of Representative Roll Call Vote on BCRA 2002 
  In Favor Against Not Voting Total 
Democrats 198 12 5 215 
Republicans 41 176 0 217 
Independents 1 1 1 3 
Total 240 189 6 435 
     
Source: Clerk of the House    
 
Hard Money Receipts Per Election Cycle (in millions) 
Party 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Democrat  $199.41   $147.02   $240.79   $169.29   $282.00   $220.24  
Republican  $341.42   $271.54   $467.21   $301.92   $467.37   $402.07  
Total  $540.83   $418.56   $708.00   $471.21   $749.37   $622.31  
       
Soft Money Receipts Per Election Cycle (in millions) 
Party 1992 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 
Democrat  $46.49   $59.66   $140.28   $101.00   $254.00   $245.85  
Republican  $63.84   $63.76   $161.86   $144.60   $255.37   $250.03  
Total  $110.33   $123.42   $302.14   $245.60   $509.37   $495.88  
       






  2000 2002 2004 2006 
All  $931,998   $918,890   $1,042,175   $1,246,768  
Democrats  $886,769   $877,047   $986,590   $1,016,492  
Republicans  $977,951   $975,445   $1,112,063   $1,514,000  
Supporters  $905,865   $906,121   $1,017,156   $1,101,042  
Non-Supporters  $964,256   $934,851   $1,073,686   $1,436,846  
     






  2000 2002 2004 2006 
All  $851,897   $855,524   $940,025   $1,229,831  
Democrats  $801,523   $816,720   $901,651   $942,571  
Republicans  $903,858   $906,665   $993,150   $1,558,909  
Supporters  $817,219   $844,072   $922,075   $1,052,245  
Non-Supporters  $894,704   $869,838   $962,633   $1,461,465  
     





Total Individual Contributions 
  2000 2002 2004 2006 
All  $477,421   $459,963   $560,356   $622,591  
Democrats  $443,412   $424,059   $544,050   $500,797  
Republicans  $510,616   $500,755   $580,183   $760,131  
Supporters  $469,847   $453,387   $567,531   $561,303  
Non-Supporters  $486,770   $468,183   $551,320   $702,532  
     




Total Corporate Contributions 
  2000 2002 2004 2006 
All  $131,727   $148,791   $173,888   $222,880  
Democrats  $98,986   $110,747   $123,785   $151,896  
Republicans  $163,859   $190,543   $229,063   $303,362  
Supporters  $99,902   $116,207   $128,895   $161,343  
Non-Supporters  $171,010   $189,521   $230,556   $303,147  
     




Total Labor Contributions 
  2000 2002 2004 2006 
All  $74,873   $77,639   $81,058   $78,435  
Democrats  $137,293   $137,010   $134,290   $127,999  
Republicans  $15,174   $20,033   $27,632   $27,436  
Supporters  $120,078   $122,761   $124,950   $119,082  
Non-Supporters  $19,073   $21,236   $25,777   $25,417  
     





Independent Variables [1] [2]
Democratic Dummy 7.9604 0.8366 **
5.1903 0.3708
ADA Score -0.0013 0.0000
0.0063 0.0006
Liberalness of Constituency 0.0272 0.0017
0.0372 0.0028
General Election Percent 
Vote Share 0.0177 0.0020
0.0450 0.0051
Interaction Between 
General Election Percent 
Vote and Democrat -0.0445 -0.0014
0.0748 0.0057
Change in Percent 
Advantage in Total Spending 
(in millions) -7.2080 *** -0.6226 **
2.7390 0.2426
Change in Percent 
Advantage in Individual 
Contributions (in millions) 7.0292 *** 0.5779 ***
2.3502 0.2054
Change in Percent 
Advantage in Corporate 
Contributions (in millions) 1.6103 0.1029
1.2265 0.1026
Change in Percent 
Advantage in Labor 





Psuedo R squared 0.5737
Ajusted R squared 0.6328
Note: Esimated standard errors are reported below the coefficent estimates (statistically significant at the * .10 level; ** .05 level; *** .01 level.
Table 1.  Logit and OLS Estimates of Votes Cast for BCRA by  House
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Group: Senate House House
Regression: Logit Logit OLS
Author: Dennis Buckley Buckley
Independent Variables [3] [4] [5]
Democratic Dummy 31.567 4.336 *** 0.759 ***
3388119 0.578 0.054
ADA Score 0.104 *** -0.002 0.000
0.038 0.004 0.000
Liberalness of 
Constituency 0.150 -0.009 -0.001
0.203 0.023 0.002
General Election 











Constant -1.673 -1.543 0.185 **
4.302 1.017 0.108
Obs 100 383 383
Psuedo R squared 0.83 0.46
Ajusted R squared 0.5547
Note: Esimated standard errors are reported below the coefficent estimates (statistically significant at the * .10 level; ** .05 level; *** .01 level.
Source: Column [1] are the estimates reported in Dennis (1998)
Table 2. Comparison to Dennis Model
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Group: House House House House
Regression: Logit OLS Logit OLS
Independent Variables [6] [7] [8] [9]
Democratic Dummy -3.3210 0.0443 3.1131 0.4060
2.2478 0.2152 6.5266 0.4247
ADA Score -0.0015 -0.0002 0.0002 0.0000
0.0045 0.0005 0.0067 0.0006
Liberalness of Constituency -0.0237 -0.0012 0.0220 0.0021
0.0250 0.0022 0.0395 0.0028
General Election Percent Vote 
Share -0.0258 -0.0037 * 0.0061 -0.0009
0.0203 0.0022 0.0553 0.0056
Interaction Between General 
Election Percent Vote and 
Democrat 0.0983 *** 0.0083 *** 0.0066 0.0030
0.0325 0.0028 0.0926 0.0062
Total Spending (in millions) -0.0122 -0.0143 0.7777 0.0201
0.6791 0.0586 1.0306 0.0990
Individual Contributions (in 
millions) 0.4572 0.0420 0.1083 -0.0249
0.8269 0.0755 1.3195 0.1165
Corporate Contributions (in 
millions) -5.5471 *** -0.5580 *** -8.2373 ** -0.5909 **
2.0990 0.2036 3.4503 0.2724
Labor Contributions (in 13.4520 *** 1.0297 *** 15.1094 ** 0.7637
4.2044 0.3876 7.1660 0.5138
Change in Percent Advantage in 
Total Spending (in millions) -8.7809 *** -0.6862 ***
3.2709 0.2414
Change in Percent Advantage in 
Individual Contributions (in 
millions) 8.0567 *** 0.6330 ***
2.8420 0.2055
Change in Percent Advantage in 
Corporate Contributions (in 
millions) 1.1290 0.0148
1.5903 0.1079
Change in Percent Advantage in 
Labor Contributions (in 
millions) 0.2495 0.0207
0.8174 0.0790
Constant 0.1505 0.4894 *** -1.3199 0.3820
1.5392 0.1673 3.8812 0.3779
Obs 382 382 382 382
Psuedo R squared 0.5254 0.6152
Ajusted R squared 0.5890 0.6273
Note: Esimated standard errors are reported below the coefficent estimates (statistically significant at the * .10 level; ** .05 level; *** .01 level.

















This study is an analysis of the roll call vote on the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security 
Act of 2008.  The Act would create a cap and trade scheme for greenhouse gas emissions.  
The benefits of this act in terms of avoided health consequences from global warming 
and the costs in terms of higher energy prices will not be evenly distributed among the 
states.  This paper uses data on the predicted economic and health costs as well as 
political variables to explain why Senators vote for the Act. The results show that 
economic costs and ideology are important factors in determining a Senator’s vote; 






The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act is one of a variety of legislative methods by 
which the government can attempt to reduce greenhouse gas emissions for the purpose of 
mitigating global climate change.  The Act could potentially be quite costly, causing the 
average household to lose an estimated 1% of consumption per year once the policy is in 
place (Buckley and Mityakov 2009).  However, not implementing a policy to curb 
emissions could be costly in terms of the health impacts of climate change.   
 
This paper seeks to analyze the way that Senators react to potential health threats 
particular to their states.  How the government reacts to future health, environmental, and 
economic costs is a serious issue for investigation. This study undertakes a positive 
analysis to determine how Senators react to conditions in their own states.  By estimating 
how much or little Senators respond to certain prospective costs to their constituents, this 
paper  contributes to the considerable literature on the principal-agent relationship 
between legislators and their electorates. 
 
Proposed legislation addressing climate change generally takes the form of either a 
carbon tax or a cap and trade scheme.  A carbon tax would directly set a price for 
emissions.  Producers who emitted carbon would choose to abate their own emissions to 
the extent that abatement was cheaper than paying the tax.  Raising the tax would lower 
the total amount of emissions, so the desired quantity of emissions could be achieved by 
adjusting the tax.  Rather than set the price of emitting and letting the market determine 
the quantity of emissions, a cap-and-trade scheme would set the total quantity of 
 40 
emissions and let the market decide how valuable the right to emit would be.  The price 
of an emission permit would be determined by the costs of abating.   
 
The Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007 (S. 2191) was the subject of many 
studies estimating its effect on the U.S. economy.  President Obama, during his 
campaign, expressed support for a cap-and-trade system targeted to reduce emissions by 
80% below 1990 levels (Marshall Institute 2008). In the weeks following his election, the 
president further expressed his interest in emission abatement by restating his reduction 
goals in a video message sent to a California climate change conference (Associated 
Press 2008).  Renewed interest in the Lieberman-Warner Act came when the Obama 
Administration supported a cap-and-trade scheme as a way of generating revenues for the 
government and addressing climate change simultaneously through a carbon-permit 
auction that was estimated to bring in from $326 to $853 billion to the government (EIA 
2008). 
 
The Lieberman-Warner Act would have created a tradable allowance system for six 
greenhouse gases - the main gas being CO2. Entities that manufacture fluorinated gasses, 
petroleum and natural gas, and entities that use more than 5,000 tons of coal per year 
would be obligated to purchase permits in order to emit these greenhouse gases.  The Act 
limits total emissions to 5,775 million metric tons (mmt) in 2012 and incrementally 
lowers the amount of total emission permits until 2050.  The final reduction in yearly 
emissions amounts to 80% of the 1990 level.  Some of the permits would be auctioned 
while some would be given to covered entities to cover transition costs and some would 
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be given away as incentives for carbon sequestration (EAI 2008).   
 
By creating a market for tradable emission permits, the government enables the pricing of  
a previously unpriced asset.  Entities that are required to purchase permits will pass part 
of the cost of these permits to the consumer just as they would in the case of an 
equivalent carbon tax– even if they are given the permits. The increased price for 
gasoline, natural gas, electricity and other goods that use these as inputs will cause 
consumers to face higher prices for many goods relative to the amount of carbon used in 
their production.  
 
Many scientists warn that if left unchecked global climate change could harm the world 
economy.  A study by Mendelson finds that the United States could lose 0.3% of GDP if 
the climate rose by 2.5 degrees Celsius while another study by Tol estimates loss of GDP 
to be 3.4% for only a one degree increase in Celsius (House of Lords 2005).   Scenarios 
of the consequences of such temperature increases include a greater number of 
increasingly intense storms, drought, and disease brought on by higher temperatures 
(Borger 2007).   
 
Senators realize they face a trade-off.  Voting for the Lieberman-Warner Act increases 
the costs of living for their constituents.  Not voting for the Lieberman-Warner Act 
increases the possibility that his or her constituents will be faced with the unpleasant 
consequences of global climate change.  Further, the costs and benefits of the legislation 
will not be constant across the states.  Some states face higher potential costs from seeing 
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energy prices rise and some states would likely see worse consequences than others if the 
temperature continues to rise.   
 
South Carolina, for instance, is a coastal state and so could see problems due to storms 
and flooding.  South Carolina also has cases arborvirus encephalitis, a mosquito-
transmitted disease.  If temperatures rise, a greater incidence of the disease could result.  
These health issues might make South Carolina’s Senators more likely to vote for the 
Act. South Carolina is not well suited for wind, solar or geothermal power generation and 
only gets 2% of its power consumption from these sources.  Thus, South Carolina may be 
more opposed to a bill like Lieberman-Warner due to the high costs of using these low-
carbon, renewable sources.  South Carolina, however, does have several nuclear power 
stations that emit no carbon.  South Carolina may be more interested in the Lieberman-
Warner Act due to the fact that over 50% of its power comes from nuclear generation.  
The average household in South Carolina, according to SIAC, is likely to earn $6,0003 
less if Lieberman-Warner passes so Senator’s might be wary of being responsible for that 
loss for their constituents.   
 
This paper uses projections of the state-by-state costs of the Lieberman-Warner Act and 
state-by-state data on potential hazards from global warming to predict each Senator’s 
decision to vote for the Lieberman-Warner Act.  Data on projected household costs of the 
Lieberman-Warner Act come from a study performed by Science Applications 
International Corporation (SAIC) on behalf of American Council for Capital Formation 
                                                
3 All dollars values are in 2007 dollars unless otherwise noted. 
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(ACCF) and the National Association of Manufacturers (NAM).  Data on potential 
hazards from global warming come from a study by the Institute for Global Risk 
Research (IGRR) conducted by Janice Longstreth.   
 
Using logit regression techniques, this paper estimates the effect of these potential costs  
on the likelihood of a Senator voting for the Lieberman-Warner Act.   The results show 
that increasing the potential reduction in household income caused by the Lieberman-
Warner Act by $1,000 causes Senators to be 60% less likely to vote for the bill.  While 
Senators react to reduction in household income very strongly, they do not seem to be 
affected by the potential health consequences from global warming noted by Longstreth.  
 
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2007 (S. 2191): 
 
The Lieberman-Warner Act was introduced to the Senate on October 18th, 2007.  After 
being read in the Senate the bill was referred to committees for amendments. On May 
20th, 2008 the amended substitute bill from Senator Boxer, S. 3036 was introduced to the 
Senate. The Senate voted on whether to proceed with the bill as it was, but the motion to 
proceed required 80% of the vote and only gathered 74%.  The bill received amendments 
that adjusted some of the wording on the United States commitment to preventing climate 
change and the date that the law would come into effect.  On June 6th, the motion to 
invoke cloture and bring the Act to a final vote failed and the bill returned to the calendar 
on July 8th.  Currently, the Lieberman-Warner Act waits to return to the Senate floor 
where it can be voted on again (Thomas.gov 2009).   
 
Like Waxman-Markey (?), the Lieberman-Warner Act would have created tradable 
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permit system for the greenhouse gases: CO2, CH4, perfluorinated compounds (PFCs) 
and SF4.  Each of these gases has a different potency, therefore the gases are converted 
into CO2-equivalents using based on Global Warming Potential (GWP). The Act limits 
total emissions to 5,775 million metric tons (mmt) in 2012 and incrementally lowers the 
amount of total emission permits to 1,732 mmt by 2050.  Not all emitters of these gases 
are required to obtain permits to be allowed to release these gases. Covered entities 
include upstream petroleum and natural gas producers, manufacturers of F-gases and 
N2O and downstream facilities that use more than 5000 tons of coal per year.   
 
To auction the permits the Act established a Carbon Market Efficiency Board.  The 
Board was intended to manage the auction as well as allow covered entities to “bank” 
permits to use in the future when permits are more scarce.  The Board would have 
auctioned 40% of the permits to covered entities while it retains the leftover permits for 
other uses (CDA 2008).  By 2050 84% of the permits would have been auctioned (EIA 
2008).  The remaining permits were to be given directly to producers to cover the cost of 
transition to cleaner technologies and to entities that invest in carbon sequestration.  
Finally, the Board would have awarded some permits to entities that reduced emissions in 
non-covered sources; these permits would have covered up to 15% of total allowed 
emissions.  In addition to using permits as incentives, some of the revenues generated by 
the auction were to be used to fund subsides for cleaner technology research (CRA 2008).  
Entities might also have purchased permits from comparable foreign cap and trade 




Lieberman-Warner also mandated higher efficiency standards for appliances and building 
codes.  One such standard, the low carbon fuel standard, required all transportation fuel 
to have an average lifecycle greenhouse gas emission of 10% than the 2008 average by 




The potential health costs that could occur as a result of global climate change are likely 
to be distributed across the country unevenly.  Robert Mendelshon points out that each 
sector has an “optimal climate,” with some areas being “too cold” and other being “too 
hot” (Mendelsohn 2005).  As such, some areas may look forward to climate change as it 
could bring them closer to an optimal temperature.   
 
Many scientists focus on the potential costs created by climate change, typically from 
areas becoming warmer than optimal.  Longstreth (1999) does a state-by-state analysis to 
find what potential health costs there may be due to climate change.  In her study, she 
identifies states that may be threatened in the future by eight different kinds of health 
consequences.  Her study looks at mosquito and rodent-borne diseases, deaths due to 
heat-related illnesses, heat waves, storms and floods, health hazards from the interaction 
of heat and pollution, and potential food poisoning from fish contaminated by algal 
blooms. Instances of these potential health issues are not evenly distributed.  Texas, 
Georgia, Missouri and Louisiana all have six of the eight issues that Longstreth identifies 
while Alaska, Idaho and Nebraska have none.   
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Senators are likely to be aware of how much their constituents would suffer from the 
higher prices brought on by the Lieberman-Warner Act.  Since the Act would apply to all 
states, some costs are going to be borne by people outside of an individual Senator’s 
constituency.  The mitigation of climate change has public good attributes in that it is 
non-rival.  This creates a tragedy of the political commons (Laband 2005).  Senators 
would be willing to vote for the Act because the costs are not necessarily borne by their 
constituents (Maloney et al 1984).  
 
The costs of the Lieberman-Warner Act are not fully internalized.  Coastal states, for 
instance, may be at risk from higher sea levels and would enjoy the benefit of climate 
change legislation.  Land-locked states like Wyoming, would face higher energy prices 
and gain none of the rewards.  Hussain and Laband (2005) find evidence that Senators 
vote for bills that impose costs in other states than their own.  Their study looks at 33 
environmental bills from 1991 to 2002 and finds that Senators are significantly less likely 
to vote for a bill when its costs are internalized by his state.    
 
Data 
The voting record of the 110th Congress on comes from the Thomas database.  The 
primary data for this paper comes from two studies.  Data on estimated household costs 
comes from a report by SIAC.   Data on projected global warming health costs comes 
from the IGRR (Longstreth 1999).   
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The dependent variable in this study is the cloture vote on S. 3036.  Since  cloture would  
end the ability of any Senator to filibuster and bring the bill to a final roll-call vote, a vote 
for cloture is a vote in favor of the bill itself.  The use of cloture votes as proxies for final 
votes is common in other studies of cases in which the bill in question does not make it to 
a final vote (Dennis 1998).  To pass a cloture vote, 60 votes are needed; the Lieberman-
Warner Act only received 48 votes.  Of those 48, 39 were from Democrats, and 9 were 
from Republicans.   
 
There are several studies that estimate the effects of the Lieberman-Warner Act (CDA, 
CRA, CTF, EIA, EPA, MIT).  Each study uses assumptions about future technology 
availability, costs of oil and other natural resources.  The SIAC study uses the National 
Energy Modeling System to estimate how the baseline economy will grow without the 
Lieberman-Warner Act and then estimates how the economy will grow with the Act.   
 
The NEMS is the modeling system used by the U.S. Energy Information Administration 
and is used in its Annual Energy Outlook reports to forecast the prices of energy into 
2030.  The NEMS model calculates how the costs of fossil fuels changes based on the 
price of permits and other assumed abatement costs.  The price changes then affect the 
demand for these products and the entire economy (EIA 2008).   
 
The SIAC study uses the NEMS model and adds some of its own assumptions about the 
future costs of abatement technologies, the capital costs of new power plants, and the 
limitations on the how quickly nuclear, sequestered coal-fired (IGCC) generation, 
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sequestered natural gas-fired (NGCC), biomass and wind energy can be constructed. 
SIAC uses the EIA’s 2007 annual energy outlook to predict fossil fuel prices for the 
baseline.  SIAC also assumes that there is no banking of allowances.   
 
All of these assumptions tend to make the estimates generated in this study higher than 
comparable studies.  The SIAC study estimates that the 2030 price of permit will be 
anywhere from $227 to $271 in 2007 dollars.  The lowest estimated price of an allowance 
was $49 dollars (CATF 2008) while most other studies examined estimated prices 
between $60 and $100 (MIT, CRA, CDA, EPA, EIA).  The higher estimated costs of 
permits increase the estimated effect of the Lieberman-Warner Act on energy prices, 
GDP, employment etc.   
 
SIAC predicts  that the average household will earn in income $98,606 under the 
business as usual scenario in 2014.  If the Lieberman-Warner Act passes, SIAC predicts 
that the average household’s income will be $1,010 lower than the baseline scenario.  
SIAC reports each state’s loss using this methodology for 2030.  Under the assumptions, 
SIAC finds that the household in the average state in 2030 will have an income that is 
around $7,000 lower than it would be if Lieberman-Warner had not been passed.  The 
summary statistics for SIAC’s findings are available in Table 1.   
 
The changes mandated by the Lieberman-Warner Act would have increased the price of 
carbon-intensive energy and caused states to alter their mix of production types based on 
the new costs.  Some states have access to geothermal power based on their geology.  
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Other states have better access to wind, hydroelectric and solar power based on their 
geography as well. The data on state electricity generation come from the Energy 
Information Administration (EIA) and summary statistics are available in Table 1.  A 
Senator’s vote is therefore likely to be affected by the presence of these facilities in her 
state.  The use of these facilities in 2007 will proxy the ability to use and expand those 
facilities in the future if the price of carbon increases rapidly.  
 
The data on public health costs comes from a study by Janice Longstreth with The 
Institute for Global Risk Research (1999).  Longstreth generates information on the states 
that may suffer disproportionately from global climate change.  Rather than use climate 
models which are still subject to much uncertainty to predict the future this study takes a 
historical perspective.  The paper looks into the prevalence of “summer weather/climate-
related diseases” and uses that to determine which regions may be more prone to the 
problems that climate change may cause.   
 
Longstreth’s study analysis three categories of potential health effects: heat-associated 
mortality and illnesses, temperature aggravated ground-level air pollutants and insect- 
and animal-borne diseases. The specific variables she identifies are: states with the 
highest age-adjusted death rates for heat-related illnesses, urban heat-wave impact data 
and recent experiences with storms or floods, states with ozone non-attainment areas, 
state history of mosquito-transmitted arborvirus encephalitis, rodent-transmitted 
hantavirus, and imported cases of malaria or dengue and states with history of algal 
blooms which cause food poisoning from fish.   
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Longstreth finds two models of climate change that predict that the death rate from heat-
associated illness will double by 2020. As such, the areas that are most at risk from heat-
associated illness will be those areas that have issues currently.  Urban areas and the 
South typically see the most age-adjusted deaths from the additional stress placed on the 
respiratory and cardiovascular systems due to higher temperatures.  Heat waves are also 
an issue in the South and large urban areas.  The average annual deaths in the United 
States from hyperthermia, or heat-related causes, was 688 (CDC 2006).  The individual 
states that have at least one heat-related death per million people in Longstreth’s sample 
are Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, Georgia, Kansas, Mississippi, Missouri, Oklahoma and 
South Carolina.   
 
Longstreth also finds a correlation between heat and increases in pollutants such as 
ozone, carbon monoxide, lead and particulates.  Increases in temperature cause the 
pollutants to be more dangerous leading to more instances of asthma and other illnesses.  
States that have counties with EPA designated ozone non-attainment areas have a higher 
risk associated with climate change.   
 
The increases in transmission of certain disease by rodent and mosquito are another 
potential health cost from global climate change.  Cold winter weather reduces mosquito 
populations thus warmer weather will allow mosquito populations to increase.  
Longstreth notes that human outbreaks of arborvirus encephalitis are correlated with 
periods in which the temperature exceeds 85ºF for several days.  While the conditions 
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necessary for malaria outbreaks to occur are rare in the United States due to low 
populations of the disease and use of air-conditioning and screens, resurgence of 
conditions suitable for malaria and dengue fever do occur in the wake of natural disasters.  
As for rodent-borne illness, hantavirus, human outbreaks of the disease are correlated 
with droughts which force rodent populations closer to human dwellings.   
 
Rising temperatures also create disease risks for coastal states.  As the surface 
temperature of the ocean rises, toxin-producing phytoplankton increase in numbers.  
Shellfish that eat the phytoplankton become contaminated and pass the toxins to humans 
that eat the shellfish.  The largest outbreaks of illness from contaminated shellfish and 
fish are in the coastal states, however, occasionally, it does affect more inland states 
when fish is shipped to them.   
 
Storms and floods are predicted to become more frequent and of greater intensity as 
global climate change continues.  Death and property damage are immediate impacts of 
these sorts of weather events, however death and illness continue in the wake of these 
events as water is contaminated, power lines are down and disease vectors increase.  
Longstreth identifies states that have had histories of issues with these events; the 
summary statistics of which are available in Table 1.   
 
Since all of Longsteth’s data are in the form of indicator variables, additional information 
has been gathered for the present study from the Centers for Disease Control (CDC).  
Specifically, additional data was found for three of the variables Longstreth identified: 
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malaria, arborvirus encephalitis, and hantavirus.   The CDC reports the number of malaria 
and hantavirus cases from 2006.  Most states report no cases of the disease and in its 
highest levels there are only 185 cases of malaria and 73 cases of hantavirus.  The CDC 
reports several types of arborvirus, La Crosse, Powassan encephalitis, St Louis 
encephalitis, and Western and Eastern Equine encephalitis. The reported data on 
encephalitis cases goes back to 1964 in some cases.  Aggregating the number of cases 
across type and year gives the number of cases over the approximately the last 30 years.  
Most states have some cases reported and only a few have more than 1,000 cases 
reported.  Summary statistics on the CDC data are available in Table 1.   
 
This paper also includes variables on ideology and lobbying activity to test how the 
decision to vote for the Lieberman-Warner Act was affected by political factors.   To see 
the effect of ideology, the estimation uses the ratings given by the Americans for 
Democratic Action.  Each of the Senators has been rated from 0 to 100 based on how 
they voted on 20 bills.  To proxy how Senators may be affected by lobbying groups, this 
paper uses Federal Election Commission data on contributions by the Sierra Club to 
candidates.  Candidates can have money directly spent on their campaign or on behalf of 
their campaign by the Sierra Club’s political action committee.  Most Senators did not 
receive any money from the PAC, however some do receive significant amount with one 
Senator receiving over $40,000 for a campaign.  Since not all of a Senator’s actions will 
be based on his own preferences, this paper will also includes Sierra Club membership as 
a proxy for a preference for environmental regulation4.  Summary statistics for the 
                                                
4 I am grateful to Frank Limehouse [and the Sierra Club??] Are these Sierra Club data provided 
by FL, or did you get some data from each? for this data. 
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political variables are available in Table 1. 
 
The state median household income data and population data used to create the 




Senators choose to bring any piece of legislation to a vote.  A vote in favor of cloture is 
essentially a vote in favor of the bill.  The relative sizes of potential costs and benefits to 
a senator’s constituency affect how likely that senator is to vote in favor.  This paper 
seeks to explain the vote with variables for the health risks the predicted household costs 
of climate change legislation and ideology. 
 
Health risks will likely cause a senator’s to be more in favor of the act.  For instance, 
Storms and floods are predicted to worsen as climate change occurs and given the fact 
that some of the costs will be borne by other states than the ones receiving the benefits, 
Senators should be very willing to vote in favor of the bill as a reaction to potential health 
costs in their state.  As Longstreth sees it, states that already have a history of these 
occurring would potentially see more if the legislation were not passed.  The expected 
sign on any of the potential health hazards proposed by Longstreth should therefore have 
a positive sign, indicating that the Senator reacted to the presence of those health risks by 
being more likely to vote for the bill.   
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The costs to the households will have the opposite effect.  Senators in states where there 
are higher costs will likely vote to protect their constituency from the price increases 
caused by the legislation.  The signs on the coefficients for job loss and household cost 
are predicted to be negative. Senators will also consider the median income of their 
constituencies. More affluent constituents will likely be more in favor of the bill if  
environmental protection has a high income elasticity of demand, as is generally 
presumed, so the coefficient on this variable is predicted to be positive.   
 
The costs predicted by the SIAC study include estimates of likely costs of construction of 
new renewable and nuclear facilities as well restricts the amount of new power produced 
by these facilities to mimic the time it would take to get new facilities operational after 
the law change.  This leaves open the potential that the states will have different laws 
regulating new nuclear power and different abilities to consume renewable energy.  To 
proxy for these differences, the percent of power generated by nuclear energy and 
renewable energy are added to the regression.  The greater the presence of these facilities 
already in the state in 2007 should indicate the costs will be lower if the act passes and 
show the predicted signs on these variables should be positive.   
 
A senator may also be influenced by her own ideology or the ideology of her 
constituents.  The ADA score is added to capture a senator’s ideology, although it may 
also reflect the ideology of the senator’s constituency.  The more a senator identifies with 
the Democratic Party the more likely he will vote for this act.   
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The decision to invoke a final roll call on the amended bill S. 3036 will be a function of, 
the household costs and other economic variables, the health costs and the Senator’s 
ideology and other political variables.   
 
Vote in favor of cloture= f (Economic factors, health factors, political 
factors)   
 
Table 2 shows the results of a logit regression that uses the economic variables, political 
variables and uses some of Longstreth’s health variables, CDC variables.  The political 
variables are all significant at the 10% level or higher.  As expected, the higher a 
senator’s ADA score the more likely that senator was to vote in favor of bring S. 3036 to 
cloture.  In fact, a 5-point higher ADA score meant that a senator was 15% more likely to 
vote in favor of cloture.  The negative sign on the amount of contributions from the Sierra 
Club is an interesting result.  It would seem that the Sierra Club does not donate money to 
people who are already going to vote the way they would like.  Rather the Sierra Club 
donates to the campaigns of senators who are on the fence.  A higher donation from the 
Sierra Club in this case means that the senator was less likely to vote in favor already.  
These results are consistent with work done by Stratmann (1992). The number of 
members in the Sierra Club is positive as predicted implying that an increase of 100 
members per one million people in the state would increase the likelihood that a senator 
votes for the Act by 40%.   
 
Of the economic variables that exerted statistically significant impacts on senators’ 
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cloture votes, all operated in the predicted direction.  Nuclear energy usage in a state 
implies that the state is already capable of producing energy with low carbon emissions.  
The sign of the coefficient on renewable energy, however, is negative but insignificant.  
The cheapest renewable energy sources may already be in use in a state, thus any changes 
in law that would increase usage of those renewable sources may be expensive and thus a 
state that heavily relies on renewable power might not be as interested in voting for the 
act.  States with higher median income were more likely to vote in favor of the act, as 
predicted, but not to a statistically significant extent.  The estimated coefficient on 
household cost is the main result of this paper and was both significant and in the 
hypothesized direction.  An increased loss of household income due to the Lieberman-
Warner Act of $1,400 – a one standard deviation increase – leads a senator to be 84% less 
likely to vote in favor of this act.   
 
The signs on the health variables are largely not as predicted.  None of the variables 
identified by Longstreth had a positive effect on the likelihood of voting for this act.  
Even when supplemented by data from the CDC, the variables are of the opposite sign 
and two of which are significant.  Other specifications in Table 3 and 4 show similar 
results; if the results are significant then they are also negative.   
 
Table 4 has uses additional explanatory variables that Longstreth does not identify.  
There are predictions that sea levels will rise as the planet warms, so coastal states may 
be more harmed than land-locked states.  The coastal variable should be positive, but is 
not and is not significant.  Similarly, global warming may have some affect on skin 
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cancer rates.  Again, skin cancer death rates do not predict whether a senator is likely to 
vote for the Act.  
 
Conclusion 
The Lieberman-Warner Act gave senators in high-risk states an opportunity to spread the 
costs of mitigating climate change to other states.  Given this political commons, 
Senators should be sensitive to the potential health costs from climate change as they will 
not necessarily have to pay for all of the benefits they will enjoy. However, nearly all of 
the explanatory power of the model comes from either political or economic variables, 
implying that Senators are not affected by the potential health threats to their states.  In 
their voting behavior, Senators seem to be demonstrating that a vote in favor of the 
Lieberman-Warner Act is based more ideological leaning of their constituents rather than 
the potential harms those constituents face from climate change.   
 
It could be argued that politicians have a high discount factor, and would rather sacrifice 
tomorrow’s environment rather than votes today.  However, the household income loss is 
also incurred in the future.  The Act itself would not have begun until 2012 and would 
likely affect price little until the emission caps started tightening.  Politicians are reacting 
to future economic costs that are themselves uncertain and potentially hard to pin on the 
Lieberman-Warner Act.  It would seem reasonable that if Senators are reacting to one 
kind of future cost that they would react similarly to other kinds. 
 
The fact that Senators do not react to the potential health affects is perhaps that they favor 
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adaptation to mitigation.  The Act would be very costly in terms of lost household 
income.  Senators, in this case, may be attempting to minimize the cost by favoring 
adaptation to mitigation. 
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Appendix II:  
 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Voted for cloture on S. 3036 0.48 0.50 0.00 1.00
Democrat Indicator 0.49 0.50 0.00 1.00
ADA Score 55.25 37.41 0.00 100.00
Amount of Money Donated by 
Sierra Club to their campaign $1,758 $5,604 $0 $42,589
Sierra Club Members as a 
percent of population 0.23% 0.13% 0.04% 0.61%
SIAC Job Loss Estimate 2030 
(in thousands) 81.06 86.50 8 450.00
Job Loss as Percent of Current 
Population 1.4% 0.2% 1.1% 1.8%
SIAC Household Cost Estimate $7,383 $1,401 $5,206 $11,701
Median Household Income 
2007 $44,201 $7,294 $31,504 $61,359
Percent of State Power from 
Renewable Energy 18% 18% 0% 65%
Percent of State Power from 
Nuclear Energy 13% 22% 0% 92%
Heat-Related Illnesses 0.18 0.39 0 1.00
Heat Waves 0.18 0.39 0 1.00
Ozone Non-Attainment Areas 0.60 0.49 0 1.00
Mosquito-transmitted 
Arborvirus encephalitis 0.50 0.50 0 1.00
Hantavirus 0.26 0.44 0 1.00
Malaria and Dengue Fever 0.64 0.48 0 1.00
Algal Blooms 0.34 0.48 0 1.00
Storms and Floods 0.20 0.40 0 1.00
Malaria Cases as a percent of 
population 0.00047% 0.00077% 0% 0.00347%
Hantavirus Cases as a percent 
of population 0.00038% 0.00052% 0% 0.00379%
Arborvirus Cases as a percent 
of population 0.00008% 0.00013% 0% 0.00073%














































































ADA Score 0.1342 *** 0.0296
0.0407 0.0077
Contributions from Sierra 
Club (in thousands) -0.1420 * -0.0313
0.0693 0.0151
Sierra Club Members per 
1 Million People 0.0018 ** 0.0004
0.0009 0.0002
Percent of State Power 
from Nuclear Energy 0.0933 * 0.0206
0.0535 0.0110
Percent of State Power 
from Renewable Energy -0.0109 -0.0024
0.0370 0.0080
Median Household 
Income (in thousands) 0.3171 0.0699
0.3439 0.0680
Predicted Household Cost 
(in thousands) -2.7243 * -0.6008
1.6034 0.3224
Heat-Related Illness -2.8221 -0.4021
2.6900 0.1996





Algal Blooms -0.0674 -0.0148
1.6087 0.3527
Storms and Floods -0.5434 -0.1123
2.0600 0.3960
Hantavirus Cases Per 1 
Million People -0.1982 * -0.0437
0.1178 0.0253
Arborvirus Encephalitis 
Cases Per 1 Million 
People -0.9069 * -0.2000
0.5335 0.1244
Malaria Cases Per 1 
























Estimated standard errors are reported below the coefficient estimates 
Asterisks imply statistically significant at the * .10 level; ** .05 level; *** .01 



















































Table 2.  Logit Regression of Cloture vote for S. 3036 using Longstreth's 








HOW MUCH DOES IT COST TO 










In this paper we summarize various estimates of the costs of mitigation of adverse impact 
of the climate change.  We find that the differences in the estimated impacts on GDP, 
consumption, employment, and gasoline, electricity and natural gas prices are mainly 
driven by the following factors: the timeframe of new technology development, growth 
potential of existing clean sources of energy, availability of offsets (domestic, 
international), and banking of allowances. 
 
However, our main finding is that even for more optimistic estimates, the mitigation costs 
are likely to amount to as much as 1% drop in consumption starting today and going into 
the future, which, as we argue, constitutes an enormous impact on social welfare. Thus, it 
is important to carefully assess the costs of global warming to see whether they justify 








Climate change issues have attracted popular interest lately. Given the current 
evidence from climatology, it seems of little doubt that the climate is getting warmer. 
There is a growing body of literature which tries to assess the costs of climate change and 
propose ways to mitigate its negative impacts.5  
The Democratic and Republican candidates in the 2008 US president election 
both favored some form of mitigation of the adverse impacts of climate change. The 
program of the winning candidate Barak Obama supports the implementation of a 
market-based cap-and-trade system to reduce carbon emissions by the amount scientists 
say is necessary: 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.6   
It appears likely that some form of cap-and-trade system to cut greenhouse-gases 
(GHG) emissions will be enacted in the U.S. in the coming years.  Thus, we feel it is very 
important for the public to fully understand both the costs of climate change and the costs 
of avoiding its negative impacts.  
While the media, policymakers, and others have given much attention to the 
possible negative impacts of the climate change, we feel that comparatively little effort 
has been devoted to presenting the cost estimates of differing mitigation strategies.  
American households will bear large costs if any of the proposed plans to curb GHG 
emissions are adopted. 
In the present paper we summarize the available household-level mitigation cost 
to further facilitate the discussion about the appropriate course of action with respect to 
global warming. We compare these estimates to gauge their relative sensitivities to 
differing assumptions. These assumptions include such estimates as the level and timing 
of proposed abatement efforts, costs and timeframe of developing new, cleaner 
technologies or improving existing ones, and mitigation efforts on part of other countries, 
among many others.   
In particular, we summarize different cost estimates generated for the Lieberman-
Warner Climate Security Act (S.2191) and discuss other legislative proposals such as the 
Low Carbon Economy Act (S.1766) and carbon tax proposals proffered by 
                                                
5 See e.g. IPCC(2007), Stern (2007). 
6 http://www.barackobama.com/pdf/issues/EnvironmentFactSheet.pdf  
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Representatives Dingell, Stark, and others.  Yet our main focus is S. 2191, since its 
proposed abatement is closer to the positions of current US. Moreover, many have argued 
a carbon tax system is not a politically viable option for the foreseeable future. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section II compares the results and 
assumptions of the seven analyses done on Lieberman-Warner Act.  Section III discusses 
S. 2191 in more depth as well as summarizes the individual analyses we investigated.  
Section IV discusses estimates of other abatement proposals.  Section V concludes.  
 
Main Findings 
We summarized seven analyses of S.2191 focusing on the cost aspects which we 
think are of particular importance to American households: change in GDP and resulting 
change in household consumption, employment changes, and increases in gasoline, 
natural gas, and electricity prices. The following groups and organizations conducted 
these studies:  
1. MIT Joint Program on the Science and Policy of Global Change 
2. The American Council for Capital Formation (ACCF) and the National 
Association of Manufacturers (NAM) 
3. CRA International 
4. The Environmental Protection Agency 
5. The Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
6. The Heritage Foundation’s Center for Data Analysis (CDA) 
7. The Clean Air Task Force (CATF) 
Impact on GDP 
GDP cost estimates vary widely from a 0.3%-0.5% to 3% drop in GDP below the 
business-as-usual in 2015 and from a 1% to 10% drop in 2050. The timeframe of 
development of new technologies and growth potential of existing clean sources of 
energy, availability of offsets (domestic, international), and banking of allowances are 
likely to account for most of these differences in GDP costs estimates. 
 
The studies above make different modeling assumptions about the abatement 
process; hence, the resulting estimates of GDP losses vary quite a lot.  Table 1 shows the 
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estimated impact on GDP from the seven studies under consideration. The MIT group, 
EIA and CATF predict comparatively lower damage to GDP (around 0.5 % in 2015 and 
2030 going up to 1% in 2050); the CRA and ACCF estimates are much higher at 1% on 
average in 2015 up to 3% in 2030. The CDA and EPA estimates fall somewhere in 
between these extremes. 
A comparative analysis of the results and models’ assumptions reveals that the 
following three factors are likely to account for the differences in the estimated impact on 
GDP: 
• The timeframe of the development of cleaner sources of energy7 and 
growth potential of nuclear and renewable sources of energy 
• The availability of offsets (domestic, international) 
• The banking of Allowances 
 
Table 2 compares the seven models in terms of their assumptions regarding these 
three factors.  Summaries that include more information about the assumptions are 
available in the Appendix, and Section III provides more detailed information about 
individual models.  
The studies that assume limited availability of alternative sources of energy or 
slower development and adoption of carbon-free sources of energy predict higher GDP 
losses.  This is quite understandable, since hitting the same abatement target with 
“dirtier” sources of energy requires greater cutbacks in energy consumption and so results 
in higher GDP loss.  GDP could decrease by a factor of two to three, depending on 
alternative assumptions.  
For example, ACCF/NAM caps some alternative energy source development and 
deployment such as wind, biomass and clean coal and natural gas carbon capture and 
sequestration (CCS) technologies.  Estimated costs reported by ACCF are higher than for 
other studies in cases when no such caps are in place.  On the other hand, the CATF study 
using the same NEMS model as ACCF, but without such severe constraints on new 
mitigation technology development, arrives at much lower GDP loss estimates. 
Many other studies include scenarios with different assumptions about alternative 
                                                
7 Carbon sequestration and storage (CSS) in particular 
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energy sources’ growth.  Different scenarios presuming strong constraints on renewables, 
nuclear and other forms of cleaner energy development arrive at larger cost estimates.  
For example, the EPA scenario with constrained nuclear, biomass and carbon capture and 
storage provides predicts GDP losses which are 1.5 to 2 times higher than the EPA 
scenarios lacking such technological constraints. Similar effects are observed in other 
studies as well. 
Table 1: Percent Change in GDP from Baseline 
Group Model Scenario
% Change in 
GDP from 
Baseline 2015
% Change in 
GDP from 
Baseline 2030
% Change in 
GDP from 
Baseline 2050
No Offsets, No 
CSS Subsidy -0.65% -0.31% -1.10%
15% Offsets -0.55% -0.54% -0.82%
CSS Subsidy -0.66% -0.26% -1.01%
15% Offsets, CSS 
Subsidy -0.57% -0.38% -0.75%
Low Cost -0.80% -2.60% NA
High Cost -1.20% -2.40% NA
CRA MRN-NEEM S. 2191 -1.75% -1.00% -3.50%
Generous -0.14% -0.56% NA
Reasonable -1.02% -2.18% NA
ADAGE -0.70% -0.90% -2.37%
IGEM -2.00% -3.76% -6.90%
ADAGE NA NA NA
IGEM -3.30% -5.90% -10.10%
ADAGE
-1.10% -2.30% -4.40%
IGEM NA NA NA
S. 2191 Core -0.30% -0.30% NA
S. 2191 Limited 
Alternative/ No 
International 
Offsets -0.90% -0.80% NA
CATF NEMS S. 2191 NA -0.70% NA
S. 2191












* ACCF/NAM reports in the year 2014. 
**EIA reports in the year 2020. 
 










No Offsets, No 
CSS Subsidy Yes No Yes
15% Offsets Yes Limited Yes
CSS Subsidy No No Yes
15% Offsets, CSS 
Subsidy No Limited Yes
Low Cost Somewhat limited Somewhat limited No
High Cost Yes Limited No
CRA S. 2191 No Yes Yes
Generous Somewhat limited Yes No
Reasonable Yes Yes No
S. 2191 No Yes Yes
S. 2191- No 
Offsets No No Yes
Constrained 
Nuclear, Biomass, 
CCS Yes Yes Yes
S. 2191 Core No Yes Yes
S. 2191 Limited 
Alternative/No 
International 
Offsets Yes No Yes







Entities covered by S. 2191 can satisfy their GHG reduction obligations by 
either purchasing carbon allowances or engaging in other projects which will offset 
their obligation.  Firms can purchase offsets from international cap and trade 
programs similar to S. 2191 or firms can engage in emission reduction for non-covered 
emission types, which lowers their obligation on the covered emissions.  
This essentially gives firms additional opportunities to satisfy emission caps, 
and, thus, leads to lower costs of abatement. When no offsets are assumed estimated 
costs go up in all models by (approximately) a factor of 1.5. 
 
The second major factor affecting mitigation cost estimates is the availability of 
domestic/international GHG offsets.  Entities covered by S. 2191 can satisfy part of their 
GHG reduction obligations by either purchasing carbon allowances or engaging in other 
projects offsetting some of their contributions. Firms can purchase offsets from 
international cap-and-trade programs similar to S. 2191. When no offsets are assumed, 
estimated costs go up in all the models. Greater availability of offsetting options reduces 
the economic impacts of Lieberman-Warner. In the EPA model, the absence of 
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international offsets increases estimated costs by a factor of 1.5, from 2% in 2015 to 3% 
in 2015 (using the IGEM model).  ACCF assumes limited amounts of offsets (<20%) in 
the high cost scenario, which increases estimated cost by a factor of 1.5 compared to the 
case where there is no such restriction on offsets.  
Third factor, which influences estimated costs is availability of “banking” or 
allowances. This allows enables firms to save unused allowances for later year, 
essentially enabling firms to gradually adjust their operations to meet targets and 
lessen the overall abatement costs. When banking is assumed estimated costs fall by a 
factor of 2. 
 Finally, the ability to “bank” or store of allowances also has a major impact on the 
estimated costs of abatement.  Allowance banking allows covered entities to save credits 
they do not use or sell in a given year.  Saving credits provides these entities more 
flexibility when the total number of credits begins to decline in future years.  If firms are 
given the opportunity to store credits, then they can gradually adjust their operations to 
meet targets and lessen the overall abatement costs.  For example, the CRA study 
estimates costs with and without the banking assumption.  When banking is permitted, 
the entire costs of programs such as those proposed by Lieberman-Warner are decreased.   
Studies assuming that no banking of allowances is permitted usually show higher 
estimates of loss in GDP: for example, the ACCF/NAM, CRA, and CDA scenarios which 
do not include banking estimate GDP losses 1.5-2 times higher than other models which 
include banking of allowances, such as the EAI and MIT studies. See Table 2. 
Impact on Consumption 
 
Consumption drops are affected by the same factors as GDP costs.  As before, 
studies which assume limited alternative sources of energy and/or limited offsets 
usually show higher (by a factor of 2 or 3) consumption cost estimates.  
 
However, GDP loss is not the most informative measure of a GHG mitigation 
plan’s household impact.  Measuring changes in consumption is a better way of 
determining each American household’s welfare loss.  While individual utility/welfare is 
not directly observable, measuring household consumption is undoubtedly a more direct 
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gauge of household well-being than GDP. Table 2 presents estimated drops in 
consumption in response to the mitigation path consistent with Lieberman-Warner in 
2015, 2030 and 2050. 
  A comparison of the estimates of Table 2 to those of Table 1, shows the expected 
pattern: studies that estimate higher drops in GDP are likely to have higher estimated 
drops in consumption as well.  Thus, the assumptions affecting GDP loss (availability of 
offsets, timeframe of development of carbon free technologies to generate energy, and 
predictions concerning the growth of nuclear and renewable sources of energy) also alter 
the magnitude of decreases in consumption. 
Studies, which assume limited alternative sources of energy and/or limited offsets, 
usually show higher consumption cost estimates, as we have seen from examining GDP.  
The ACCF study, which puts caps on development of nuclear and alternative energy 
sources, models  declines in consumption two to three times higher than the MIT, EPA or 
EAI studies, which do not make such restrictions. Moreover, an ACCF scenario 
tightening caps on renewable energy development and limiting offset amounts (the “high 
cost” scenario) estimates consumption losses increase by a factor of 2.8.  When EAI 
assumes limited alternative to coal and no international offsets, its estimates of 
consumption losses increases by a factor of 2 to3. 
Impact on Social Welfare 
Even more optimistic studies predict huge welfare costs in terms of 
consumption.  A lower estimate involves a drop in consumption of 0.8%-1% below the 
business-as-usual scenario in every year starting in 2008 and going into the future, 
which represents a huge decrease in social welfare.   
 
 The consumption costs estimates permit us also to evaluate the Lieberman-
Warner’s impact on social welfare. In particular we answer the following questions: How 
large are the estimated drops in consumption? How can we quantify what a 0.8% 
decrease in consumption in 2015 or a 3% drop in 2050 means for us today when the 
abatement decision needs to be taken?   
We measure the impact on individual well-being (following Lucas 1990) in terms 
of balanced growth equivalent. That is, we assume that under the business-as-usual 
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scenario consumption is growing at a constant rate. Mitigation efforts cause consumption 
to drop below this path. Table 2 contains estimated drops in consumption in 2015, 2030, 
and 2030. When computing balanced growth equivalent we assume that consumption is 
growing at the same rate as under business as usual scenario, but its level is permanently 
below the business as usual path by some percentage. This percentage is chosen so that 
individual well-being under balanced growth equivalent was the same as under mitigation 
path. We report this percentage in the Table 2 as well. 
 Our calculations suggest that consumption under mitigation is equivalent to a 
constant (in percentage terms) drop in consumption of around 0.8%-1% each year, 
starting today in 2008 and continuing to 2050. 
 
Table 3: Percent Change in Consumption from Baseline 
Group Scenario
% Change in 
2015
% Change in 
2030







No Offsets, No 
CSS Subsidy -0.35% -1.93% -2.36% -0.96%
15% Offsets -0.29% -1.60% -2.10% -0.81%
CSS Subsidy -0.37% -1.93% -2.26% -0.97%
15% Offsets, CSS 
Subsidy -0.31% -1.47% -2.01% -0.77%
Low Cost -1.00% -2.90% NA
-0.98% (-1.57%)
High Cost -2.80% -4.90% NA -2.57% (-3.09%)
CRA
-4.50% -3.50% -4.20% -3.17%
Cost Per 
Household
Generous -0.60% -0.48% NA -0.41% (-0.42%)
Reasonable -1.35% -0.94% NA -0.89% (-0.90%)
S2191: ADAGE -0.43% -0.91% -2.10% -0.65%
S.2191: IGEM -0.66% -1.44% -3.26% -1.02%
S. 2191 Core -0.40% -0.50% NA -0.31% (-0.36%)
S. 2191 Limited 
Alternatives/No 
International 
Offsets -1.20% -1.10% NA -0.86% (-0.91%)
CATF
S. 2191 NA -0.90% NA NA
Change in Per 
Capita GDP
MIT









Change in Personal 
Consumption
EPA**
Change in Market 
Consumption
 
* ACCF/NAM reports in the year 2014. 
**EIA reports in the year 2020. 
*** Estimates in brackets are computed for studies with “NA” in 2050 on the assumption that damages in 
2050 equal to damages in 2030. 
 
 At first glance, a consumption decrease of one percent may appear trivial.  
However, it is worth remembering Nobel Prize winner Robert Lucas estimated the 




 “…I estimated the overall gain in welfare to be around 1 percent of 
consumption, or perhaps slightly less. … It is about twice the welfare gain 
that I have elsewhere estimated would result from eliminating 10 percent 
points of inflation, and something like 20 times the gain from eliminating 
post-war sized business fluctuations. It is about 10 times the gain Arnold 
Harbenger (1954) once estimated from eliminating all product-market 
monopolies in the U.S.”  
We estimate that costs of mitigation could be of the same order of magnitude as the 
welfare effects discussed in the citation above: quite large. In this light it is once again 
important to assess the costs of global warming to see whether they justify incurring such 
costs.  
Another way to assess these cost figures is to look at the impact of the decrease in 
consumption on the average American household. Table 4 presents the estimated impact 
of 1% decrease in consumption for an average household of four people. Projections for 
business-as-usual scenario consumption are taken from Paltsev et al (2008) study. 
 
Table 4. Impact on Consumption of Average American Household. 
2008* 2015 2030 2050
Population (Million) 301 321 359 397
Consumption (billion 2005$) $8,217 $11,533 $17,761 $29,567
Consumption/Per capita (2005 $) 27,760 $35,928 $49,474 $74,476
Decrease in consumption 
per capita (2005 $)
Decrease for a family of 4 (2005 $) $1,110 $1,437 $1,979 $2,979
$277 $359 $495 $745
*2005 data are used, 2008 are likely to be even higher. 
 
We find that mitigation path is equivalent to a permanent tax increase for the 
average American household. This increase is projected to amount to an additional $1100 
in taxes in 2008. Moreover, this tax is increasing over time in real terms from about 
$1400-$2000 during 2015-2030 up to $2000-$3000 in 2030-2050.  
Average American spends about $2500 on food annually, or approximately $208 
                                                
8 See Lucas (1990). 
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monthly. Decrease in consumption per capita of $277 annually is equivalent, thus, to 
more than one month without food for the average American, keeping other consumption 
levels constant.9 
Another way to gauge this impact would be to compare it to the auto-loan 
payments. All new 2009 C-Class Mercedes can be leased for $429 per month10. A 
decrease in consumption by $1110 amounts to 2,5 monthly payments on this luxury car, 
and note that you have to make such payments each and every year and those payments 
grow in size (it is almost 3,5 monthly payments in 2015 and almost 7 payments in 
2050).11 It is as if you have this luxury car for 2,5 or 7 months out of the year but do not 
allowed to drive it. 
But average American household usually does not buy a Mercedes. What about 
Honda Civic? All new 2009 Honda Civic LX could be bought for around $189 a month.12  
A decrease in consumption by $1100 equals to almost 6 monthly payments on this car 
every 12 months (it is 15 monthly payments per year in 2050, i.e. you “buy” more than 
one car in later years). Again you pay for the car but do not use it. 
Thus, we feel that both from scientific and general public point of view the costs of 
mitigation are likely to be rather high.  
Clarifying our Message 
Before we move on to discuss other costs estimates we would like to once again 
clarify our message to avoid the confusion, which is sometimes made in the literature. 
We find that the costs of mitigation are equivalent to a drop in consumption levels13 
below the business-as-usual scenario by 1%.  
 The Natural Resources Defense Council (NRDC) recently published a critical 
summary of many of the analyses we have examined in this paper.14 The NRDC 
                                                
9 Of course in equilibrium each consumer would change its consumption bundle to avoid being without 
food. This is just an illustration of the magnitude of the impact. 
10http://www.carlton.mercedescenter.com/portal/site/DWS72100/menuitem.2bd76a9308ae9c856a916a913a
a13453/?vgnextoid=e4407aaeb9a3a110VgnVCM10000014174335RCRD 
11 Note that estimated costs in Table 4 are in real (2005 $) terms. We also make an assumption that 
Mercedes does not go up in price faster than other goods. 
12 http://www.piedmontcars.net/ 
13 We prefer to speak in terms of consumption since this measure allows us to make welfare calculations. 




summary suggests that15 abatement will have only moderate impacts on welfare because 
cap-and-trade will not stop the growth of US it will just make it slower. The NRDC study 
also criticizes some of the studies, we surveyed, for suggesting that abatement would 
involve drops in GDP levels.  
We find that the costs of mitigation are equivalent to a drop in consumption 
levels16 below the business-as-usual scenario by 1%. This does not mean that 
consumption or GDP would actually drop in 2008 by 1%. Most of the costs of mitigation 
are to be incurred in the future, when abatement targets become tighter. What we mean is 
that all these future costs are equivalent to a permanent drop in consumption by 1% 
below what it is today and would be have been in the future without the mitigation. That 
is, under abatement consumer’s well-being will be the same as in the case when we cut 
consumption under no abatement by 1% in every year starting in 2008 and going into the 
future.  
Of course, we could restate the same welfare costs in terms of a lower growth rate 
in consumption/GDP rather than drops in consumption levels.  These are just alternative 
ways of measuring the welfare loss.  We prefer balanced growth equivalent estimates 
since they are more standard in macroeconomic calibration exercises.  
 The fact that GDP does not drop below its 2008 level under the abatement 
scenario does not mean that the costs of mitigation will be small.  The problem is that 
GDP drops below its potential level, the one that would have been attained if mitigation 
did not take place. Our analysis of available estimates suggests that the welfare costs of 
mitigation consistent with the provisions of Lieberman and Warner are going to be quite 
large.  
Prices of Carbon Allowances 
Estimates of the impact of S. 2191 on employment, the prices of power and fuels 
                                                
15 “The most important finding is that, regardless of whether the study is a peer-reviewed academic or 
government analysis, or a non-peer reviewed industry-backed forecast, one prediction is the same: per 
capita household income (as measured by per capita gross domestic product, or GDP) will not decrease 
from today’s levels. In fact, all of the projections forecast robust economic growth, despite the limits on 
global warming pollution contained in the CSA. … The studies do, however, differ in a very crucial way 
with respect to how they present their results: some give the impression that average household income will 
decrease from today’s level (generally, these are the industry-backed studies), while others are careful to 
present their estimate more accurately as how much less a household’s income is likely to grow as a result 
of the CSA.” 
16 We prefer to speak in terms of consumption since this measure allows us to make welfare calculations. 
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hinge on the estimated price of carbon allowances.  The estimated price of an 
allowance depends on the availability of banking of permits, the amount of offsets 
available, the technological development of CCS systems and the number of different 
GHGs covered.  
 The estimates of Lieberman-Warner’s impact on employment, energy and fuel 
prices hinge on the estimated price of carbon allowances.  The estimated price of these 
allowances is highly sensitive to several assumptions.  Among these assumptions are the 
availability and extent of banking of allowances, the availability of offsets, the 
development of CCS systems, and the number of different GHGs covered. 
 S. 2191 provides for banking of allowances, but the estimates from the CDA and 
ACCF/NAM do not include banking in their models’ assumptions.  The CRA, which 
does including banking, estimates the presence of banking will cause the price of 
allowances to be higher prior to 2040, but considerably lower afterwards.  Thus, in the 
CRA scenarios, banking reduces the total estimated cost of S. 2191 by $4.7 trillion 
dollars.  
 Many analyses test for cost-estimate sensitivity by altering the number of foreign 
and domestic offsets available at a given time.  Lieberman-Warner allows covered 
entities to use domestic and international offsets for up to 30% of total emissions.  The 
analyses typically restrict the number of offsets in the various cases that they examine.  
Lowering the number of potentially available offsets increases the price of permits and 
keeps total emissions closer to the emission path described by the law.   
 The studies also incorporate varying assumptions vis-à-vis the future feasibility of 
CCS and the construction of new low carbon power plants.  Many authors note that 
nuclear power is a low-carbon alternative to coal, but regulatory and societal objections 
present enormous problems for constructing new plants.  Other “clean-energy” 
alternatives like wind and biomass are similarly expected to have potential expansion 
issues.  The analyses also examine costs when CCS technology is either expensive or 
completely unavailable.  Studies by ACCF/NAM and CDA assume alternative power is 
limited, the EIA and EPA studies test various assumptions about its CCS availability, and 















No Offsets, No 
CSS Subsidy $59.15 $106.53 $233.42 
15% Offsets $50.72 $91.35 $200.17 
CSS Subsidy $57.91 $104.30 $228.52 
15% Offsets, CSS 
Subsidy $50.44 $90.83 $199.03 
Low Cost $36.69 $227.52 NA
High Cost $38.36 $271.27 NA
Banking $50.00 $90.00 $190.00
No Banking $40.00 $80.00 $350.00
Generous $50.37 $69.90 NA
Reasonable $50.37 $90.46 NA
ADAGE $30.55 $64.27 $167.53
IGEM $42.14 $87.45 $231.80
ADAGE NA NA NA
IGEM $81.13 $168.58 $447.79
ADAGE
$57.95 $118.01 $305.55
IGEM NA NA NA
S. 2191 Core $30.84 $62.71 NA
S. 2191 Limited 
Alternative/No 
International 
Offsets $78.12 $160.36 NA














* ACCF/NAM reports in the year 2014. 
**EIA reports in the year 2020. 
Prices converted to 2007$ using CPI 
 
 Finally, the MIT study results illustrate that covering other sources of GHGs in 
addition to carbon dioxide allows reduction in total emissions to be achieved at lower 
cost.  Only the CDA study limits reductions to carbon dioxide instead of the full array of 
GHGs covered by Lieberman-Warner.  This may partially explain why the CDA’s 
predictions are relatively high even when compared to the ACCF/NAM study, which 
otherwise makes similar assumptions. 
Impact on Employment 
The assumptions driving the price of carbon allowances also affect the 
employment estimates.  A higher predicted a carbon allowance price gives producers a 
tighter margin and they are forced to shed jobs to maintain profit levels. 
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Three of the analyses models changes in employment.  The ACCF/NAM, CDA 
and CRA estimate the net change in employment due to S. 2191.  They assume that jobs 
will be created in new “green” industries like the new power plants incorporating CCS 
technology.  In each of the three cases, the changes in employment correlate with 
movements in the price of carbon allowances.  The ACCF/NAM study shows carbon 
prices steadily rising as the number of allowances falls over time; as a result, the NEMS 
model predicts that the net change in employment is negative and increasing.  The 
ACCF/NAM study predicts the loss of 850 million to 1.86 billion jobs in 2014 and up to 
3.04 to 4.05 billion jobs lost by 2030.  Alternatively, the CDA study predicts an increase 
in employment of 120 million jobs in 2015 as people are hired in the new “green” 
industries, under generous assumptions.  However, the CDA predicts that more than 
500,000 jobs could be lost by 2015.  Over the lifetime of Lieberman-Warner, the CDA’s 
estimates predict that job losses will be somewhere between 430,000 and 460,000 in 
2030. 
The assumptions driving the price of carbon allowances also affect employment 
estimates.  A higher predicted price of a carbon allowance gives producers a tighter 
margin and they are forced to shed jobs.  Both the ACCF/NAM and CDA assume that 
there is no banking of allowances, while the CRA does assume banking.  Banking allows 
entities covered by S. 2191 to save allowances for future use.  Without banking, the price 
of allowances will start low but rise quickly as the number of available permits falls.  
Saving drives up the price of allowances in 2015, but it allows the price to be lower than 
it would be without banking after 2040.  In 2015, the CRA estimates that there will be 
3.75 million jobs lost.  The CRA study models job losses of up to 2.5 and 7.10 million in 
2030 and 2050, respectively.  Banking might explain why the CRA estimates of job 
losses are higher than the ACCF/NAM and CDA estimates in 2015.  Neither the 
ACCF/NAM nor the CDA estimate job losses in 2050, but if the banking assumptions 
influence relative magnitudes of the estimates, then the assumptions behind the 
ACCF/NAM and CDA analyses would possibly predict more job loss by 2050 than the 
CRA estimate.   


















2050 (millions of 
jobs)
Low Cost -0.85 -3.04 NA
High Cost -1.86 -4.05 NA
CRA MRN-NEEM -3.75 -2.5 -7.1
Generous 0.15 -0.46 NA
Reasonable -0.717 -0.43 NA
ACCF/NAM* NEMS
CDA* GI
* ACCF/NAM reports in the year 2014. 
 
Impact on Electricity Prices 
 Table 7 shows the estimated change in the electricity prices from the baseline 
year.  Electricity prices will increase much more than gasoline prices. Lieberman-
Warner’s cap-and-trade system is estimated to raise the price of electricity by anywhere 
from 5% to 15% in 2015 and anywhere from 14% in the EPA core scenario to 128% in 
the ACCF/NAM’s high cost scenario in 2030.   
The CATF model predicts a 7% increase from the 2005 price in 2030.  The EIA, 
MIT, and ACCF/NAM studies predict a 10%, 37%, and 124% increase in electricity 
prices from their baseline scenarios to 2030, respectively.  By 2050, electricity prices will 
have leveled off somewhat, returning to near 2015 levels according to the MIT and EPA 
estimates. 
   
Table 7: Percent Change in Electricity Price from Baseline 
Group Model Scenario
% Change from 
Baseline 2015
% Change from 
Baseline 2030
% Change from 
Baseline 2030
Low Cost 14.00% 101.00% NA
High Cost 15.10% 128.40% NA
CRA MRN-NEEM 15.00% 35.00% 60.00%
S. 2191 Core 5.20% 14.40% NA
S. 2191 Limited 
Alternative/No 




* ACCF/NAM reports in the year 2014. 
**EIA reports in the year 2020 
Impact on Gasoline Prices  
 Table 8 shows the percent difference between the estimated baseline price and the 
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S. 2191-estimated price.  All models predict that S. 2191 will increase the price of 
gasoline above the reference scenario price.  The CRA predicts that gas prices rise 145% 
above the reference scenario in 2015, but prices are only 30% in 2030 because the higher 
CAFE standards are part of the 2030 baseline.  The estimates of gas prices show a large 
range of increases.  The lowest estimates are CATF’s and EPA’s core scenarios increases 
of 11.6% and 16.7% by 2030, respectively.  Alternative scenarios using higher-cost 
assumptions model increases in the gasoline prices above the reference of anywhere from 
41.2% to 145% by 2030.  
Table 8a in the Appendix indicates the estimated change in the price of gasoline 
from the 2005 level.  Most models predict that gasoline prices will steadily rise through 
2050. In 2015, models that have more generous technology assumptions find that gas 
prices could be lower than they were in 2005; other models predict gas prices will be up 
to 25% higher than they were in 2005.  By 2030, there is a wide spread in estimates.  The 
CATF study has the lowest estimate of a 5% increase above the 2005 price. The MIT 
model and the strictest EIA model predicts a 40% to 45% increase while the ACCF/NAM 
models predicts 66% increase in the generous scenario and a 130% increase in the 
reasonable scenario. The MIT study, however, estimates that gas prices will hit their 
highest level in 2030 and return to 2015 levels (which are 20% higher than the 2005 
price) by 2050.  However, the EPA model predicts that 2050 gas prices will be 66% 
higher than the 2005 price. 
 We must note which models incorporate S. 2191’s policies on fuel efficiency.  
Lieberman-Warner requires that all transportation fuels must become 10% less carbon 
intensive by 2020.  The CRA is the only analysis that incorporates this fuel requirement.  
This provision causes the price of gasoline to increase rapidly in the early part of the 
forecast; the addition of a stringent fuel-efficiency assumption may be why the CRA’s 
price estimates are higher than the others. 
 Each model also has a module that estimates the effects of S. 2191 on gasoline 
prices.  The assumptions underpinning these models are rarely specified in the papers but 
undoubtedly affect the price estimates.  Many analyses are not clear in how they model 
changes in the prices of gasoline.  Will gasoline producers simply pass along carbon 
permit costs to consumers?  Only the CATF and EPA models explicitly state they assume 
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the full cost of the carbon permit is ultimately borne by consumers.  
Table 8: Percent Change in Gasoline Price from Baseline 
Group Model Scenario
% Change from 
Baseline 2015
% Change from 
Baseline 2030
% Change from 
Baseline 2050
Low Cost 13.00% 77.00% NA
High Cost 50.00% 145.00% NA
CRA MRN-NEEM 145.00% 30.00% 82.00%
S. 2191 Core 9.30% 16.70% NA
S. 2191 Limited 
Alternative/No 
International 
Offsets 20.30% 41.20% NA




* ACCF/NAM reports in the year 2014. 
**EIA reports in the year 2020 
Impact on Natural Gas Prices  
 Table 9 shows the estimated increase in the price of natural gas from the baseline 
price.  Under lower cost assumptions, the models predict that the price of natural gas will 
be from 12% to 17% higher in 2015 than the baseline cases.  In cases with higher costs, 
natural gas could increases 20% to 49% higher than the baseline estimate in 2015.  One 
thing is certain: any cap-and-trade system will increase the use of natural gas.  Natural 
gas is the best alternative now available to non-CCS coal. If we reduce coal-powered 
energy generation, we will probably rely heavily on natural gas as a substitute.  By 2030, 
the increased reliance on natural gas will cause the estimated prices to rise 20% to 107% 
higher than baseline prices in low-cost scenarios and 87% to 145% in the high 
cost/limited alternatives cases.   
Natural gas prices are particularly sensitive to the development of other low-
carbon alternatives to existing coal-produced power.  The pace and scope of CCS 
development has massive implications for future natural gas demand.  For example, in an 
ACCF/NAM case assuming limited low-carbon alternatives to coal, natural gas prices 
rise more than 200% above 2005 levels by 2030.  The EIA also predicts increases in the 
price of natural gas of around 200% in its limited alternative case by 2030.  Even the 
EIA’s core scenario predicts natural gas will cost 118% more in 2030. The MIT also 
predicts that natural gas will be 64% higher than 2005.  By 2050, MIT predicts natural 
gas prices will have declined slightly, but do not return to near the 2015 levels. 
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Table 9: Percent Change in Natural Gas Price from Baseline 
Group Model Scenario
% Change from 
Baseline 2015
% Change from 
Baseline 2030
% Change from 
Baseline 2030
Low Cost 17.90% 107.80% NA
High Cost 20.70% 145.70% NA
CRA MRN-NEEM 12.50% 20.00% 90.00%
S. 2191 Core 14.20% 26.10% NA
S. 2191 Limited 
Alternative/No 
International 




* ACCF/NAM reports in the year 2014. 
**EIA reports in the year 2020 
 
Overall, our results suggests that despite the differing assumptions, the welfare 
effects of GHG abatement paths consistent with Lieberman-Warner are likely to be huge. 
Our analysis demonstrates that even under more optimistic assumptions, the costs of 
abatement consistent with cutting emissions to about 80% below 1990 level, as suggested 
by the Lieberman-Warner mitigation scenario, are going to be enormous.  For this reason, 
we emphasize that it is important to carefully assess the costs of global warming to see 
whether they justify similar or more drastic mitigation efforts. 
Summaries of the estimates. 
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act S. 2191 (S. 3036) 
We start our review with the Lieberman-Warner Act, which has received 
considerable attention.  It was introduced to the Senate on October 18, 2007.  The bill 
was referred to the Committee on Environment and Public Works and the Subcommittee 
on Private Sector and Consumer Solutions to Global Warming and Wildlife Protection.  
These committees held hearings throughout November in which they drafted a substitute 
bill containing the committees’ revisions.  
On May 5th, 2008 the amended substitute bill from Senator Boxer, S. 3036, was 
introduced to the Senate.  S. 3036 was under consideration by the Senate on June 6th, but 
the vote to invoke a final roll call vote on the passage of the bill failed and the bill 
returned to the Senate calendar on July 8th to be considered again at a later date.   
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Features of the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act (S. 2191)  
• Limits total emissions to 5775 million metric tons (mmt) in 2012 and to 1732 
mmt in 2050. This amounts to a reduction in the emissions of CO2 and four other global 
warming pollutants by 4% in 2012, 19% in 2030, and 71% in 2050 below 2005 levels.17 
The targets are stricter for emissions of heat-trapping hydrofluocarbons (HFCs): 15% in 
2020, 45% in 2030, and 70% in 2040.18 
• Creates a tradable allowance system for the CO2, CH4, perfluorinated 
compounds (PFCs), SF4, and HFCs. Converts non-CO2 gases into CO2-equivalents 
using Global Warming Potential (GWP).  Thus, it covers 86% of total emissions. 
• Requires allowances be obtained by upstream petroleum and natural gas 
producers and manufacturers of HFCs and PFCs (also known as F-gases) and nitrogen 
dioxide and downstream facilities that use more than 5,000 tons of coal per year.   
• Gives away a percentage of allowances that declines over time to cover 
transition costs to covered entities and manufacturers as incentives for carbon capture and 
storage (CCS).  Auctions the remaining allowances using the revenues to fund low-
carbon technology research and development. 
• Awards domestic offsets based on carbon capture and the reduction of non-
covered emissions, which may be used to cover 15% of obligation.  Permits the use of 
foreign allowances from comparable cap and trade systems to cover 15% of obligations. 
• Establishes the Carbon Market Efficiency Board to allow banking of allowances 
and to potentially adjust the number of allowances created. 
Seven Analyses of S.2191  
 In this section we review and compare seven cost estimates of the Lieberman-
Warner’s abatement schedule.  
 
1. Model: Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA)  
Group: Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) Joint Program on the Science and 
Policy of Global Change 
Authors: Sergey Paltsev, John M. Reily, Henry D. Jacoby, Angelo C. Gurgel, Gilbert E. 
                                                
17 This amounts to reduction of emissions by 40% below its 1990 levels. 
18 http://www.nrdc.org/legislation/factsheets/leg_07121101A.pdf  
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Metcalf, Andrei P. Sokolov and Jennifer F. Holak  
  Paltsev et al. use MIT’s Emissions Prediction and Policy Analysis (EPPA) model 
to estimate the legislation’s effects on total emissions in the United States, the price of 
energy and the resulting effects on consumer welfare.  The MIT study modeled particular 
provisions in Lieberman-Warner: upstream implementation, inclusions of non-CO2 
gases, the crediting of allowances for reducing non-covered emissions, banking of 
allowances, and the distribution of allowances as incentive to use carbon capture and 
storage (CCS) technology. 
 The analysis tests various stringency assumptions by changing the amount of 
offsets available and the effect of a government subsidy for CCS.  It specifically does not 
estimate how S. 2191 interacts with other mandates for reducing emissions (for instance 
H.R. 6), the effects of mixing of free distribution and auctioning of allowances, or the 
Federal Carbon Market Efficiency Board.  
 The MIT study presents a baseline scenario and four other scenarios.  The strictest 
scenario does not allow any offsets nor include the subsidy for CCS technology.  The 
second scenario relaxes the offset restriction to cover up to 15% of emissions.  They 
assume that foreign offsets are too costly to be feasible.  The third scenario returns offset 
availability to zero and adds the CCS subsidy.  The final scenario allows both 15% 
offsets and the CCS subsidy.  This scenario is actually the closest to the actual provisions 
of Lieberman-Warner. 
Under the assumptions mentioned above, the paper finds that price of an 
allowance will rise steadily over time as total emissions levels fall from 5775 mmt in 
2012 to 1732 mmt in 2050.  Allowance costs range from $47 to $56 under their strictest 
assumptions in 2015 and rise to $188 to $221 by 2030.19 
The EPPA model predicts GDP in 2015 will be 0.65% lower than baseline GDP 
in the strictest scenario and 0.57% lower in the more relaxed case.  By 2050, GDP is 
estimated to be 1.1% to 0.75% lower in the strictest and least strict cases.   
The economy-wide amount of spending on consumption falls due to price 
increases.  The model predicts that consumption could fall from 0.29% to 0.37% in 2015 
and 2.01% to 2.36% in 2050.  Paltsev et al. use equivalent variation to measure the 
                                                
19 All dollar values are denominated in 2005 dollars.   
 
 85 
effects on consumer welfare; essentially, equivalent variation gauges how much a person  
would pay to avoid an increase in prices.  The model predicts that welfare loss 
would be 0.7% in 2015 in both the cases and would be 1.81% and 1.54% in 2050.  Stated 
another way, consumers would be willing to pay $9.7 billion to avoid the price increases 
that S. 2191 creates in 2015 and they would be willing to pay $554.2 billion to avoid the 
price increase in 2050 for the least strict model.   
The paper also estimates that by 2050, the prices of petroleum products will 
increase by around 22%, natural gas by around 82% and electricity by around 61% from 
2005 levels.   
2. Model: National Energy Modeling System (NEMS)  
Group: American Council for Capital Formation (ACCF) and National Association of 
Manufacturers (NAM)  
Authors: Science Applications International Corporation (SAIC)  
 The analysis in this paper was conducted by SAIC based on the assumptions and 
information provided by ACCF and NAM.  The paper uses the National Energy 
Modeling System (NEMS) to estimate the effect of S. 2191 on national economic 
indicators, energy production and energy prices.  The estimate includes the effect of H.R. 
620 as well as updated construction costs for power generating facilities.  
 The ACCF and NAM assume two different scenarios, which they call “low cost” 
and “high cost.”  Under the low-cost scenario, offsets are available for more than 20% of 
emissions, oil prices are set based on the Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2008, and there 
are built-in constraints for each kind of power generation. The high-cost scenario 
constrains available offsets to be between 15% and 20%, uses AEO 2007 High Profile 
Side case for the price of oil and has tighter caps on building.  Neither scenario accounts 
for any banking of allowances.   
 Under these assumptions, SAIC finds that carbon allowance prices will rise from 
$36.6921 in 2014 to $271.27 in 2030.22  GDP decreases as the allowance prices rise over 
                                                
20 H. R. 6 increases higher CAFE standards to 35 mpg and sets the minimum mpg at 27.5.  The bill also 
increases production of renewable fuels from 4 billion to 36 billion gallons and increases efficiency 
standards on certain household appliances, light bulbs and electric motors. 
21 All dollar amounts denominated in 2007 dollars. 
22 These estimates of the price (and all resulting effects on GDP and prices of energy) are sensitive to the 
assumption that there is no banking of allowances.  A study conducted by CRA International tested the 
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the period of the forecast.  In 2014, GDP is 0.8% lower than the baseline in the low cost 
scenario and 1.6% lower in the high cost scenario.  By 2030, GDP is 2.6% and 2.7% 
lower than the baseline in the low cost and high cost scenarios respectively.  Due to 
higher production costs, the net job loss attributed to S. 2191 would range from 0.85 
million jobs to 1.86 million jobs in 2014 and 3.04 million jobs to 4.05 million jobs in 
2030.   
 The model estimates that the loss to the average household income would be 1.0% 
to 2.8% in 2014 to 2.9% to 4.9% in 2030.  The paper also estimates that the residential 
price of electricity will rise by about 13% above the baseline in 2014 and between 101% 
and 129% in 2030.   Natural gas is also predicted to rise from 18% to 21% in 2014 and by 
108% to 146% in 2030.  Total expenditures on energy rise due to the price increases from 
15.5% to 33.5% in 2014 to 78.7% to 114.5% in 2030.   
 
3. Model: Multi-Region National (MRN-NEEM)  
Group: CRA International  
Authors: W. David Montgomery, Anne E. Smith  
 CRA International uses their MRN-NEEM model to estimate the effects of the 
Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act.  The MRN-NEEM is a “multi-region national” 
model that integrates a macroeconomic model of all economic sectors, consumers and 
income, consumption, investment, and trade with a model of the energy and non-energy 
sectors. It predicts Lieberman-Warner’s effects on total emissions, price of the carbon 
allowances and energy, as well as the share of total power of various types of power 
generation.   
 The CRA model includes the low carbon fuel standards and the CCS provisions 
of S. 2191 as well integrating the provisions of H.R. 6.  It models updated predicted oil 
costs using the Annual Energy Outlook 2008.  The increased CAFE standards, renewable 
fuel standards and appliance efficiency mandated by H.R. 6 are already integrated into 
the baseline estimation.   
                                                                                                                                            
effect of banking on allowance price and found that banking increases the price in the short run and 
decreases the price in the long run.  CRA estimates that banking reduces the present value of the costs of S. 
2191 by $100 billion.  W. David Montgomery, et al., “Economic Analysis of the Lieberman-Warner 
Climate Security Act of 2007 Using CRA’s MRN-NEEM Model,” CRA International (April 2008) 
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 This paper finds that the price of a carbon allowance starts at around $50,23 rises 
to around $80 by 2030 and to $190 by 2050.  The CRA study also tests the effect of not 
allowing firms to borrow against future allowances.  Without the banking, the price of an 
allowance remains lower than under the banking scenario until 2040, when they rise 
sharply due to the high abatement costs that firms would incur within the next twenty 
years; therefore, firms prefer to be net borrowers of allowances in the short run.  The 
CRA study estimates that allowing the banking of allowances reduces the present 
discounted costs of S. 2191 by $100 billion.   
 The model predicts that S. 2191 would cause GDP to fall by 1.9% in 2015.  The 
effects of S. 2191 are mitigated from 2025 to 2035 due to costs of the CAFE standards 
already in place in the baseline.  However, by 2050 GDP falls by nearly 3.5% because 
caps in that year mandate near-zero emissions.  The present discounted cost of S. 2191 is 
estimated to be $5.3 trillion by 2050.   
 The cost per household is estimated to be over $2,000 (or 4.5% of household 
income) in 2015 falling to just above $1,000 (2% of household income) in 2025 and 
rising again to $2,000 by 2050.  The CRA study models a yearly household income of 
$50,000 when modeling the household cost amounts.  CRA also estimates the loss in 
employment to be nearly 4 million jobs in 2015 and over 7 million by 2050.  
 The prices of motor fuel, natural gas and electricity rise due to the allowances.  In 
2015, electricity and natural gas prices are around 15% above the baseline estimate and 
motor fuel is over 140% higher.  By 2050, motor fuel and natural gas are around 90% 
higher than the baseline and electricity is around 60% higher 
4. Model: Applied Dynamic Analysis of the Global Economy (ADAGE) and 
Intertemporal General Equilibrium Model (IGEM)  
Group: Environmental Protection Agency  
 In this study, the EPA, at the request Senators Joseph Lieberman and John 
Warner, estimated the impact of S. 2191 on GHG emissions, the price of energy and the 
resulting impacts on other economic indicators.  The EPA uses two models, ADAGE and 
                                                
23 Denominated in 2007 dollars. 
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IGEM,24 to estimate three baseline scenarios and seven scenarios that embody various 
technologies, costs and availabilities.  Specifically, the EPA tests the sensitivity of 
estimates by constraining the growth of technology like nuclear, biomass and carbon 
capture and storage (CCS) by assuming no international actions that go beyond what is 
required by the Kyoto Protocol and the availability of offsets.  All cases allow for the 
banking of allowances and base future oil prices from the Annual Energy Outlook 2006.  
The study does not, however, include other measures that would reduce GHG emissions, 
such as H.R. 6. 
 The price of a carbon allowance under the assumptions of its “core” S. 2191 
scenario is $2925 in 2015 and increases to $159 in 2050, as estimated by ADAGE, and 
$40 in 2015, increasing to $220 in 2050, as estimated by IGEM.  The scenario in which 
no offsets are available estimates the highest prices of $77 in 2015 and $425 in 2050.  
The “high technology” S. 2191 case estimates the lowest prices at $22 in 2015 rising to 
$121 in 2050.   
 The increased cost of energy lowers GDP by 0.18% in 2010, 0.9% in 2030 and 
2.37% in 2050 according to ADAGE predictions of the baseline versus the core S. 2191 
scenario.  IGEM predicts more dire consequences to GDP, showing a loss of 0.94% in 
2010, 3.76% in 2030 and 6.9% in 2050.26  ADAGE predicts losses to total U.S. 
consumption of 0.43% in 2020 and 2.10% in 2050.  IGEM predicts even larger losses of 
0.66% in 2020 and 3.26% in 2050   
 According to ADAGE, households are estimated to lose about $446 in 
consumption or 0.43% of the baseline estimate in 2015.  This number increases to $3,984 
in 2050 or 3.26% less than the baseline household consumption.  The price of a gallon of 
gasoline in 2030 is estimated to be $3.11.  These estimates of future oil prices do no take 
into account interruptions in supply or temporary changes in the price and only represent 
the expected cost changes due to the law.  Electricity prices will rise over the forecast 
period from the 2005 price by nearly 20% in 2015, 30% in 2030 and then fall back to 
20% over the 2005 level in 2050.   
                                                
24 Applied Dynamic Analysis of the Global Economy (ADAGE) and Intertemporal General Equilibrium 
Model (IGEM). 
25 Denominated in 2005 dollars. 





5. Model: National Energy Modeling System (NEMS)  
Group: Energy Information Administration (EIA) 
 The EIA, an agency of the Department of Energy, examines the effects of S. 2191 
on energy prices and the economy at the request of several senators.  The EIA uses the 
National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) for its forecasts.  The model provides a 
baseline which includes H.R. 6, the Energy Independence and Security Act of 2007, 
estimates of voluntary technology adaptation provided by the EPA and forecasts of prices 
from the Annual Energy Outlook (AEO) 2008.   
 The S. 2191 “core” scenario models the effects of the cap and trade system for 
Group I GHGs and the bonus credit for carbon capture and storage (CCS) as well as other 
features of S. 2191.  The EIA also forecasts using five other scenarios in which there are 
no international offsets available, high costs for electricity generating facilities, limited 
alternatives to coal power, and both limited alternatives to coal and no international 
offsets.   
 The EIA study predicts that the price of a carbon allowance will be $3027 in 2020 
and $61 in 2030 under the core scenario assumptions.  The highest estimated price is 
found in the strictest case – limited alternatives and no international offsets – is $76 in 
2020 and $85 in 2030.   
  
6. Model: Global Insight   
Group: The Heritage Center for Data Analysis (CDA)  
Authors: William W. Beach, David W. Kreutzer, Ben Lieberman, and Nicolas D. Loris  
 The CDA examines the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act using a model 
developed by Global Insights.  This study estimates a baseline that incorporates important 
elements of previously enacted energy legislation28 and features of S. 2191.  The main 
feature of S. 2191 that is modeled is the cap on CO2 emissions.  The paper does not 
model the effect of the law on all of the GHG gases, only CO229 is considered; nor does it 
                                                
27 Denominated in 2006 dollars. 
28 Such as the higher CAFE standards mandated in H.R. 6. 
29 The estimates of the price of an allowance (and all resulting effects on GDP and prices of energy) are 
sensitive to the assumption that there is no banking of allowances. A study conducted by CRA International 
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model the effect of banking of allowances,30 both of which are features of S. 2191. 
 The CDA models two different scenarios that might occur with S. 2191.  In both 
of theses scenarios nuclear power is constrained to never be more than the base case, 
reflecting the difficulty in expanding production.  In what is called the “generous” case, 
key technologies such as carbon capture and storage (CCS) are ready to be deployed 
when it becomes cost effective to use them.  In the “reasonable” scenario, those key 
technologies do not exist within the twenty-year forecast. 
 The price of a carbon allowance is $49 in both the generous and reasonable 
forecasts in 2015.  By 2030, the price rises to $68 in the generous model and $88 in the 
reasonable model.  The generous forecast predicts that GDP will be 0.55% lower than the 
baseline in 2016 and 2030, while the reasonable forecast predicts GDP will be 1.41% 
lower in 2016 and 2.17% lower in 2030.  Due to lower GDP, the economy has 166,000 
fewer jobs than the baseline estimate in 2016 and 461,000 fewer jobs in 2030 according 
to the generous assumptions.  The reasonable forecast predicts 855,000 fewer jobs than 
the baseline in 2016 and 431,000 fewer jobs in 2030.  In 2016, personal consumption is 
predicted to fall by 0.89% under the generous assumptions and 1.61% in the reasonable 
forecast.  By 2030, the predicted loss to personal consumption has been mitigated 
somewhat and is estimated to be 0.48% under the generous assumptions and 0.93% under 
the reasonable assumptions. 
 
7. Model: NEMS  
Group: Clean Air Task Force (CATF)  
Author: Jonathan Banks  
 The CATF uses the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) the effects of S. 
2191 on the economy and energy production.  CATF assumes that technology improves 
                                                                                                                                            
tests the effect of banking on allowance price and finds that banking increases the price in the short run and 
decreases it in the long run.  CRA estimates that banking reduces the present value of the costs of S. 2191 
by $100 billion.  Montgomery, W. David, et al., “Economic Analysis of the Lieberman-Warner Climate 
Security Act of 2007 Using CRA’s MRN-NEEM Model,” CRA International (April 2008).  
30 The estimates of the model are also sensitive to the number of different GHGs covered.  Metcalf et al. 
find that by extending policy to cover more GHGs, the same reduction in total emissions can be achieved at 
a lower cost because abatement is less expensive for small amounts of reductions for many different gases.  




according to the Energy Information Administration’s “best available technology,” and 
that the deployment of biomass power will be constrained.  The features of S. 2191 that 
the CATF models are unlimited banking of allowances and the revenue from the auction 
of allowances will be used to produce a tax credit for carbon capture and storage.  The 
CATF did not incorporate the new low carbon fuel efficiency standards, the Carbon 
Market Efficiency Board or limits on the future sources of power like nuclear or wind.   
 The study finds that the price of a carbon allowance starts at just over $1531 in 
2015 and rises to $45 in 2030 as the number of carbon allowances created falls.  
According to the study, GDP falls by 0.7% in 2030, which places the economy just four 
months behind the business as usual case. Per capita GDP falls by 0.9% from the 
reference case by 2030.   
 The CATF study also claims that even though the price of electricity rises, real 
spending on electricity falls from 2007 to 2030 due to improvements in end-use 
efficiency.  Similarly, the price of natural gas rises, but real yearly expenditures on 
natural gas increases by only a dollar from 2007 to 2030.  CATF also estimates that the 
cost of carbon allowances is almost completely passed through to the consumer, raising 
the price of gasoline by roughly $0.10 for every $10 per ton of CO2.   
 While other studies show that natural gas power generation increases until the 
point at which CCS becomes economic, this study shows that the subsidies for CCS 
cause it to enter earlier, and thus the price of natural gas does not have to rise as much as 
it would be expected to otherwise.  However, the study does note that if either CCS or 
nuclear power is not allowed to expand for political or technological reasons, then natural 
gas will fill in the gap that coal-burning plants leave.  The study does not predict that coal 
without CCS will be removed from the market by 2030 and still represents around 150 
gigawatts of power supply. 
Other proposals 
S. 1766 
 The Bingaman-Specter Low Carbon Economy Act creates a cap and trade system 
for greenhouse gases similar to the Lieberman-Warner Act.  S. 1766 was introduced to 
                                                
31 Denominated in 2004 dollars. 
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the Senate for comment in June 2007 and was subsequently sent to the Committee on 
Environment and Public Works.  S. 1766 creates allowances that permit total covered 
emissions to be 6600 mmt in 2015.  The government would lower the amount of 
allowances created until 2050, when the total allowances sold reduces emissions to 60% 
of 1990 levels (1927 mmt of CO2-e).  As the number of allowances auctioned is lowered, 
the price of an allowance will rise.  Many industries fear that abatement will be very 
costly and so the only option will be to emit and purchase allowances, which will cause 
the price of an allowance to be very high.  To allay those fears, S. 1766 comes with a 
“release valve” called a Technology Accelerator Payment (TAP), which essentially is an 
upper limit on a price of carbon allowances. 32  Regulated entities can always meet their 
obligation by paying the TAP price, which is set at $12 in 2012 and grows at 5% per year 
in real terms.  Because of this, the price of an auction will never exceed the TAP price. 
Under S. 1766, a percentage of allowances, which declines over time, is given away to 
regulated entities and there are also bonuses allotted for reducing GHGs from non-
covered emissions and subsidies for carbon capture and storage. 
 The EIA uses the National Energy Modeling System (NEMS) to estimate the 
economic and environmental impact of S. 1766.  The EIA estimates two reference cases.  
In both cases the EIA uses the forecasts from the AEO2007.  However in one case they 
estimate the effects of the law using more optimistic assumptions on the availability of 
technology.  The major features of S. 1766 that the EIA tests are the cap and trade limits, 
the TAP price, and bonus credits for CCS and non-energy abatement.  For sensitivity, the 
EIA tests a scenario in which the CCS bonus is only half of what S. 1766 uses, a scenario 
with the optimistic technology assumptions, a scenario with supporting environmental 
policies like H.R. 6, a scenario with both optimistic technology assumptions supporting 
policies, and a scenario with limited alternatives to coal. 
 In each scenario, the TAP program is activated by 2030 and the price of an 
allowance does not rise above the TAP price for that year.  Only in the “high technology” 
case in 2020 does the EIA predict that the price of an allowance is lower than the TAP 
price.  Because of the TAP, total emissions in 2020 and 2030 are expected to exceed the 
                                                
32 If the price of an allowance ever rises above the TAP price, then the cap and trade system becomes 
essentially a tax on carbon emissions.   
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total covered emissions.  In all of the cases except limited alternatives to coal, in 2015 
GDP is higher with S. 1766 than the predicted baseline.  By 2030, most scenarios are 
nearly equivalent to the baseline, but the core S. 1766 GDP is around 0.05% below the 
baseline and the limited alternative scenario predicts GDP will be 0.25% below baseline.  
As higher energy costs raise prices across the economy, real consumption falls by about 
0.1% from the baseline in 2030 in the core scenario and by 0.2% in the limited 
alternatives scenario. 
 The cost of the allowances is passed forward into higher prices for gasoline, 
natural gas and electricity.  In 2020, gasoline prices are predicted to be 0.06% higher than 
baseline, natural gas prices are predicted to be 0.7% higher, and electricity prices are 
predicted to be 0.5% higher.  By 2030, gasoline and natural gas are predicted to be 0.8% 
higher and electricity is predicted to be 0.085% higher.  The limited alternatives scenario 
predicts a small (less than .01 percentage points) increase in the prices of these goods.   
Carbon Tax Proposals 
 Metcalf et al. (2008) employ MIT’s Emission Prediction and Policy Analysis 
(EPPA) to estimate the effects of the carbon taxes on CO2 emissions, welfare costs, 
prices of consumer goods, tax revenues, and the effects on each income decile. Each tax 
proposal varies in the level of the tax and the way in which the tax grows-or remains 
constant- over time.  The estimated costs to consumer welfare vary with each plan, from 
a nearly 1% gain under the least stringent plan to a 2% loss under the most stringent.  
Using information from the Consumer Expenditure Survey, the authors show that the 
carbon tax is regressive, but a lump sum per capita return of tax revenues is progressive.  
Each proposal considered taxes only carbon, however, if the taxes are extended to cover 
all greenhouse gases (GHGs) there are significant reductions in the lost consumer 
welfare.  The authors also make comparisons between the tax plans and comparable “cap 
and trade” proposals and find there is little difference.   
 The three different plans analyzed are named for their main proponents in 
Congress, Dingell33, Larson34, and Stark-McDermott35.  The Dingell Bill proposes a 
$13.64 tax per ton of CO2 emitted along with a separate tax on gasoline of $0.50; neither 
                                                
33 Dingell proposal still in draft. 
34 H.R. 3416; America’s Energy Security Trust Fund Act of 2007 
35 H.R. 2069; Save Our Climate Act of 2007 
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tax changes over time36.  The Larson Bill has an initial tax rate of $19.96 that grows in 
real terms of 10% per year.  The Stark Bill has an initial rate of $10 that grows in nominal 
terms of $10 annually.  Each bill has its own plan for using the tax revenues.   
 Metcalf et al (2008) predicts the level GHG emissions over time37 for each plan. 
The Dingell Bill is the least stringent plan and as such has the smallest effect on total 
emissions.  The plan keeps total emissions at current levels until 2025 when emissions 
begin increasing at a rate comparable to the “business as usual” reference scenario.  In 
2050, the plan reduces emissions to 12 billion metric tons (bmt) per year from 13.5 bmt 
in the reference scenario.  The Stark Bill manages to keep total emissions constant at 
today’s levels of 8 bmt per year by 25%. The Larson Bill’s relatively high tax rate 
reduces emissions to 4 bmt per year or roughly half of the current emission levels and 
40% of the reference emission levels.   
 The EPPA model predicts the welfare costs of each plan.  These costs include 
changes in market consumption as well as effects on leisure.  The aggregate present 
discounted welfare change for the Dingell plan is a 0.01% gain in welfare due to the 
EPPA model’s assumption that other countries will take steps to reduce emissions that in 
effect lower oil prices.  The Stark plan has a slight loss to welfare of 0.03%.  The Larson 
plan has the largest effect of a 1.2% reduction present discounted aggregate welfare.   
 The authors also model the tax plans covering non-CO2 GHGs.  Since initial 
abatement for any gas is easier than subsequent reductions, extending the tax plan to 
cover all GHG can result in significant decrease in the tax rate. In fact, when more GHG 
are included the tax rate required to get to the same reduction in total emissions as under 
carbon-only tax falls under each plan.  The Larson plan’s initial tax rate could be reduced 
to $13.30 per metric ton of CO2 emitted, the Stark plan’s initial tax rate could be reduced 
to $1.50 and the Dingell plan’s initial rate could be reduced to $12.80. Lowering the tax 
rate also reduces the welfare costs of each plan.  The net present value of the aggregate 
welfare costs is reduced from 0.3% to 0.11%.   
 The tax revenue from each tax plan is substantial and can be returned to 
consumers in such a way as to mitigate and even reverse the regressive nature of the 
                                                
36 All dollar denominated in 2005 dollars 
37 Total GHG emissions includes the amount of CO2 emitted plus all other GHG weighted by their 
potential effect on global warming. 
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carbon tax.  In 2015, the potential tax revenues from the plans are $88, $69 and $126 
billion per year from the Dingell, Stark and Larson plans, respectively.  These tax 
revenues could account for 4% of total Federal tax revenue under the Stark plan and up to 
7% under the Larson plan.  As the tax rate in the Stark and Larson plans rises over time, 
revenues increase substantially; for the Larson plan in 2050 the carbon tax revenues 
would account for 21% of Federal tax revenue.   
 Using EPPA predictions on increases in prices on electricity, gasoline and other 
consumer goods of a generic $15 tax per ton of CO2 emitted and information from the 
Consumer Expenditure Survey, the carbon tax is found to be regressive, but the level of 
its regressivity depends on a number of key assumptions.  The first assumption is that 
consumers do not change behavior.  If the full amount of the tax is shifted onto the 
consumer, then the poorest 10% of the population faces a 3.7% reduction in income while 
the richest 10% faces a 0.8% reduction in income.  However, a per capita lump sum 
return of the tax revenue would actually result in making the carbon tax plan progressive.  
Another positive effect of a carbon tax is that the revenue can be used to reduce taxes on 
labor or capital and, thus, increase overall economic efficiency.  
Conclusion 
 In this paper we have provided a brief summary of estimates of the greenhouse 
gases emissions’ abatement costs with particular focus on households.  
GDP reduction estimates vary widely from 0.3% to 3% drop below business-as-
usual in 2015 and from 1% to 10% in 2050. The timeframes of new technology 
development and growth potential of existing clean sources of energy, availability of 
offsets (domestic, international), and permissibility of allowance banking are likely to 
account for most of these differences.  
Consumption costs are affected by the same factors as GDP costs. Therefore, 
studies, which assume limited alternative sources of energy and/or limited offsets, usually 
predict smaller decreases in consumption than studies, which do not make such 
assumptions. (Estimated costs could differ by a factor of 2-3).  
Despite the differences in estimates, our analysis strongly indicates the abatement 
costs could be around a 0.8%-1% of drop of consumption below the business-as-usual 
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scenario.  This is a conservative estimate; many studies project that costs are likely to be 
even higher. Given these estimates, we can conclude that the costs of mitigation are likely 
to be huge. According to Lucas (1990), a 1% permanent cost of consumption estimate is 
“something like 20 times the gain from eliminating post-war-sized business fluctuations.  
It is about 10 times the gain Arnold Harbenger (1954) once estimated from eliminating 
all product-market monopolies in the U.S.”  
 Our research indicates that quantifying the costs of proposed policies dealing with 
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Summary of Assumptions of the Models 
MIT: EPPA  
 • Banking of allowances   
 • No use of foreign allowances  
 • Four Cases  
  o No Domestic Offsets; No CCS Subsidy  
  o CCS Subsidy  
  o 15% Domestic Offsets  
  o 15% Domestic Offsets; CCS Subsidy  
  
ACCF/NAM: NEMS  
 • No banking of allowances   
• Caps on nuclear, sequestered coal-fired (IGCC) generation, sequestered natural 
gas-fired (NGCC), biomass and wind energy  
 • Estimated capital costs of new plant construction  
 • Two Cases  
  o Low Cost  
   • Greater than 20% Offsets  
   • AEO 2008 Oil Prices  
  o High Cost  
   • 15% to 20% Offsets  
   • AEO 2007 “High Profile Side Case” Oil Prices  
  • Tighter caps on nuclear, sequestered coal-fired (IGCC) generation, 
sequestered natural gas-fired (NGCC), biomass and wind energy  
  
CRA: MRN-NEEM  
 • Banking of allowances and one scenario of no banking  
 • AEO 2008 natural gas prices, electricity demand growth, non-electric CO2  




 • Includes effects of H.R. 6  
  o CAFE standards  
  o Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS)  
  o Efficiency standards on power supplies and some appliances  
  
EPA: ADAGE and IGEM  
 • Banking of allowances 
 • AEO 2006 
 • Three baseline estimations  
  o Normal  
  o High technology  
  o High technology and international actions 
 • Seven Cases  
  o Encapsulate different assumptions on prices, offset availability, 
technology growth, limitations on nuclear power and actions of other nations  
  
CDA: Global Insight  
 • No banking of allowances  
 • Focus on CO2 only  
 • Two Cases  
  o Reasonable   
   § Assumes CCS does not develop with 20 year forecast  
   § No nuclear power beyond the base case  
  o Generous  
   § Assumes CCS is used for any coal-fired power plant built after 2018  
   § No nuclear power beyond the base case  
  
EIA: NEMS  
 • Banking of allowances  
 • 6 Cases  




  o S. 2191 Core  
  o High Cost  
  o Limited Alternative to Coal  
  o No International Offsets  
  o Limited Alternatives and No International Offsets  
  o S. 1766  
  
CATF: NEMS  
 • S. 2191  
  o Banking of allowances  
  o 30% Offsets  
  o Bonuses and Subsidies for CCS  
  o Subsidies for geological carbon sequestration (GCS), energy efficiency,   
  o Money to offset electric and natural gas price increases  
  o Constrains deployment of biomass  
  o Unlimited nuclear growth  
  o EIA’s “Best Available Technology” Case  
 
Estimating the Impact on Consumption Assumptions and Technical Details. 
In this section we describe how to compute the balanced growth equivalent to the 
mitigation path consistent with Lieberman-Warner’s.  To find the balanced growth 
equivalent, we calculate the fraction consumption must decrease below the business-as-
usual model in order to provide an individual the same level of utility/well-being as the 
abatement scenario. 
Assumptions 
In order to find that fraction we make the following five assumptions: 
First, we assume a representative consumer with a constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) utility function with a risk aversion parameter of 1 or 2.  Consumers 
typically prefer minor changes in consumption over a longer period of time rather than 
having a large one-time change.  The risk aversion parameter captures how much a 




are fairly standard in macroeconomic calibration exercises, and these figures are 
consistent with the assumptions made in Stern (2007) and Lucas (1990).   Estimated costs 
differ only in the 4-th digit when we change risk aversion parameter.  Thus, we present 
only one of the estimates in Table 2.  
 The second important assumption is that the rate of pure time preferences is about 
3%-4%.  The time preference reflects the consumer’s desire,  other things being equal, to 
consume today rather than tomorrow. This is consistent with Lucas (1989, 1990).  If we 
follow Stern (2007) and assume this figure to be 0.1%, we are likely to get much higher 
estimates, though many authors argue that such choice of rate of time preference would 
be too low.38  
 Third, we need to account for growth in the U.S. population when computing 
social welfare.  We assume that population grows at 0.6% annually taken from Paltsev et 
al. (2008).  
 Fourth, we must make assumptions concerning how consumption fluctuates in the 
intervening years between 2015, 2030 and 2050, since we only have cost estimates for 
those specific years.  We use linear interpolation between the intervals so that decreases 
in consumption changes linearly between 2015 and 2030, and 2030 and 2050 to attain the 
estimated values presented in Table 2. 
 Finally, where the risk aversion parameter is 2, we assume that consumption per 
capita grows at 2% annually under business-as-usual scenario, following the Paltsev et al 
(2008) model).   As we show in the technical appendix, when risk aversion coefficient is 
1 we do not need to make any assumptions about consumption growth.39  Since the 
estimates for the two risk-aversion numbers are virtually the same, this last assumption 
does not make a big impact on the results. 
Technical Details 
Consider an artificial economy with single infinitely lived consumer who has the 
same consumption stream as the aggregate consumption. We assume that the consumer 
maximizes discounted sum of utilities of the form: 
                                                
38 See Nordhaus (2007), Weitzman (2007) for the discussion on this issue. 

















= N0 exp(nt) is the population in period 
! 
t , where 
! 
n  is the rate of 
population growth. Following current population growth projections (e.g., Paltsev et al 








  is an instantaneous utility function, describing the utility derived 
from consumption at a given point in time.  The assumption of this particular utility form 
is standard in macroeconomics and usually 
! 
"  is assumed to be somewhere between 
! 
1 and 
4, see e.g., Lucas (1990) (Assumption 1).  
! 
" > 0 is the rate of pure time preference.  We assume it to be 3-4% (Assumption 
2) 
 Also let under the business as usual scenario, i.e., without the costs of mitigation 
and the costs of climate change, consumption grows at the constant rate 
! 
g . Thus, 
consumption would evolve as:  
 
! 
Ct = C0 exp(gt). 
 Following Paltsev et al. (2008), we assume that g=2% under business-as-usual 
scenario.40   Given the recent economic situation, this number probably should be 
adjusted downward. (Assumption 5)  
 The Lieberman-Warner Act requires some abatement of GHG emissions which 









 in 2015, 2030, and 2050. We use linear interpolation (Assumption 4 to 
approximate consumption drops in other years). Thus the consumption path under 





= C0 exp(gt)(1"# t ). 
 Our task is to compute constant growth equivalent to this path, i.e., to compute 
! 
"  
such that if consumption declines by fraction 
! 
"  below the business-as-usual path, then 









= C0 exp(gt)(1"# t ).  
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q = exp(n + (1"# )g " $) . Thus, we can find the necessary drop in consumption !  

















 This is the equation we use to compute the estimates of consumption drops.  Since 
t
!  are given only at 2015, 2030 and 2050, we use linear interpolation to infer the value 
of consumption drops in other years, i.e., we assume that in other years 
t
! changes 
linearly between known values in years 2015, 2030, and 2050.  
 There is slight disadvantage to the approach above.  We need to make an 
assumption about the growth rate of consumption in the business as usual scenario.  It 
appears that in a particular case we can overcome this problem. 
 Assume that the instantaneous utility function is logarithmic.  This approach has 
the advantage that now we need not make specific assumptions about the path of 
consumption under the business-as-usual scenario.  As the derivation below shows, under 
the log specification, estimated growth equivalent costs of mitigation will not depend on 
the path of consumption under the business-as-usual scenario. Yet the disadvantage is 
that some economists would argue that 
! 
" =1 may be a bit too low.41 
 In this case constant (in percentage terms) drop in consumption 
! 
"  would solve: 
                                                
41 Stern (2007) assume 
! 





















 cancels from both sides of the equation above, hence 
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 Using the outlined method for each of the scenarios in Table 2, we computed 
constant-over-time loss in consumption equivalent to estimated losses in consumption 
reported by Table 2.  This constant loss is to be incurred every year starting today (2008) 
and going into the future up to 2050 or 2030.  We stop our calculations at those time 
horizons because the studies do not model impacts of abatement on consumption beyond 
that timeframe.  
 However, most studies show that over time, consumption would drop more and 
more below its no-abatement level.   In this regard, our estimate provides a lower bound.  
Also under a rate of time preference around 3-4%, anything happening after 2050 is 
unlikely to have any sizeable impact on our figures.  For the studies which stopped at 
2030, we compute two estimates: one for the horizon up to 2030, the other for the horizon 
up to 2050 with the assumption that damages between 2050 and 2030 are the same as the 
last available estimate, the one in 2030.  We see that in this case, the estimate of the costs 
of mitigation will be even higher. 
 
Text of the Program  
% This program is used to compute the impact on consumption of the 
% mitigation path consistent with Lieberman Warner Climate Security Act of 
% 2007 S2191 
n=0.006 % population growth 
g=0.02 % consumption under BAU scenario 
rho=0.04 % rate of pure time preference 








alpha15=data(j,1);   
alpha30=data(j,2); 
alpha50=data(j,3);   
for t=t0:T 
    if t<=2015 
        alpha(t-t0+1)=0+alpha15*(t-t0)/(2015-t0); 
    else 
        if t<=2030 
            alpha(t-t0+1)=alpha15+(alpha30-alpha15)*(t-2015)/(2030-2015); 
        else 
            alpha(t-t0+1)=alpha30+(alpha50-alpha30)*(t-2030)/(2050-2030); 
        end 





    SA=SA+(q^(t-t0))*((1-alpha(t-t0+1))^(1-gamma)); 








    SAl=SAl+(q^(t-t0))*log(1-alpha(t-t0+1)); 











Group Model Scenario Index 2015 Index 2030 Index 2050
No Offsets, No 
CSS Subsidy 1.61 1.81 1.61
15% Offsets 1.56 1.79 1.6
CSS Subsidy 1.6 1.57 1.61
15% Offsets, 
CSS Subsidy 1.55 1.57 1.61
Low Cost 1.16 2.24 NA
High Cost 1.17 2.54 NA
ADAGE 1.1 1.3 1.2
IGEM NA NA NA
S. 2191 Core 1.02 1.1 NA
S. 2191 Limited 
Alternative/No 
International 
Offsets 1.23 1.63 NA







* ACCF/NAM reports in the year 2014. 
**EIA reports in the year 2020. 
‡ Index constructed by using the EIA reported price of residential electricity in 2006 as 8.91 cents per kwh 
in 2006 dollars. 
 
 
Table 8a: Change in Index of Gasoline Price (Index, 2005=1) 
Group Model Scenario Index 2015 Index 2030 Index 2050
No Offsets, No 
CSS Subsidy 1.28 1.4 1.21
15% Offsets 1.29 1.45 1.23
CSS Subsidy 1.28 1.4 1.21
15% Offsets, CSS 
Subsidy 1.29 1.45 0.12
Low Cost 0.98 1.66 NA
High Cost 1.3 2.3 NA
ADAGE NA 1.33 1.66
IGEM NA NA NA
S. 2191 Core 1.07 1.19 NA
S. 2191 Limited 
Alternative/No 
International 
Offsets 1.18 1.44 NA







* ACCF/NAM reports in the year 2014. 
**EIA reports in the year 2020. 
‡ Index constructed by using the EPA reported price of a gallon of gasoline in 2005 as $2.35 in 2005 
dollars. 
 




Group Model Scenario Index 2015 Index 2030 Index 2050
No Offsets, No 
CSS Subsidy 1.14 1.97 1.87
15% Offsets 1.15 2.12 1.98
CSS Subsidy 1.13 1.57 1.65
15% Offsets, 
CSS Subsidy 1.15 1.64 1.77
Low Cost 1.63 3.33 NA
High Cost 1.67 3.94 NA
S. 2191 Core 1.74 2.18 NA
S. 2191 Limited 
Alternative/No 
International 
Offsets 2.28 3.24 NA





* ACCF/NAM reports in the year 2014. 
**EIA reports in the year 2020 
‡ Index constructed by using the EPA reported price of a tcf of natural gas in 2005 as $7.51 in 2005 dollars. 
• Index constructed by using the CATF reported price of natural gas per MMBTU in 2006 as $13.80 in 
2006 dollars. 
 
Constructing the Index 
Models estimate the price changes on gasoline, natural gas and electricity in one 
of two ways: one, the model may estimate a baseline price and the price under S. 2191, so 
that a percentage change in price caused by S. 2191 can be evaluated; two, the model 
may estimate a price and create an index based on a base price-typically the 2005 price.   
This allows readers to gauge the how prices will be in the future compared to today.   
These two kinds of estimates are not readily comparable without additional 
information.  Since the models that present price change estimates as an index do not 
report the estimate of the future baseline price, it is not possible to calculate the percent 
change from the baseline caused by S. 2191.  However, when studies report a predicted 
future price an index can be constructed that does allow direct comparison.  
For example, the EIA reports that the price of a gallon of gas in 2030 will be 
$2.95 in 2006 dollars.  The EPA reports that the 2005 price of gasoline was $2.34 in 2005 
dollars.  Adjusting the EIA predicted price for inflation using the CPI, the predicted 2030 
price is $2.88.  Dividing the inflation adjusted EIA predicted price by the EPA reported 
price of gasoline yields 1.23, meaning there will be a 23% increase in the price of 










ADA Score 0.1309 *** 0.032166
0.0376 0.00907
Contributions from Sierra 
Club (in thousands) -0.1595 ** -0.0391998
0.0740 0.01825
Sierra Club Members per 
1 Million People 0.0004 0.0000964
0.0008 0.00019
Percent of State Power 
from Nuclear Energy 0.0547 0.0134563
0.0498 0.01234
Percent of State Power 
from Renewable Energy 0.0437 0.0107302
0.0401 0.00994
Median Household 
Income (in thousands) 0.0853 0.0209637
0.2078 0.05114
Predicted Household Cost 
(in thousands) -1.2528 -0.3079175
0.9134 0.22818
Heat-Related Illness -0.0418 -0.0102549
2.1617 0.52922





Algal Blooms 0.5239 0.1292246
1.5732 0.38568




Arborvirus Encephalitis -1.2107 -0.2892353
1.8217 0.41024




































Table 3.  Logit Regression of Cloture vote for S. 3036 using Longstreth's 
Health Variables
Estimated standard errors are reported below the coefficient estimates 
Asterisks imply statistically significant at the * .10 level; ** .05 level; *** .01 































ADA Score 0.1335154 *** 0.0270844
0.0407978 0.00789
Contributions from Sierra 
Club (in thousands) -0.1455505 ** -0.0295258
0.0722863 0.01532
Sierra Club Members per 
1 Million People 0.0019222 0.0003899
0.001285 0.00025
Percent of State Power 
from Nuclear Energy 0.0994659 * 0.0201773
0.0522052 0.00978
Percent of State Power 
from Renewable Energy -0.0052417 -0.0010633
0.0408348 0.0082
Median Household 
Income (in thousands) 0.2949334 0.0598291
0.4017053 0.0714
Predicted Household Cost 
(in thousands) -2.608623 -0.5291754
1.912082 0.33299
Heat-Related Illness -2.613605 -0.3466399
2.55507 0.17159






Storms and Floods -0.4313781 -0.0824983
2.446124 0.43731
Hantavirus Cases Per 1 
Million People -0.2074499 * -0.0420825
0.1248051 0.02504
Arborvirus Encephalitis 
Cases Per 1 Million 
People -0.9111839 * -0.1848393
0.5185856 0.11634
Malaria Cases Per 1 
Million People -0.6386881 -0.1295619
0.61629 0.101
Skin Cancer Deaths Per 1 







Pseudo R squared 0.7472
Notes:






































































Estimated standard errors are reported below the coefficient estimates 
Asterisks imply statistically significant at the * .10 level; ** .05 level; *** .01 
 
